I'm a philosophy undergrad current working on my senior capstone project. In short (and apparently metaphysically incorrect) I'm looking at prenatal genetic information ethics around balancing a parent's right-to-ignorance and their obligation ensure the health/safety of the future child.
When I met with my philosophy advisor (who is also not the professor leading the senior capstone class, therefore he had not seen my argument/topic before I had reached out. This meant that I had already done most of my research and had some parts written) he explained to me that I need to reformat my argument as "Obligation to future child" is metaphysically wrong, as it is impossible to have a directed obligation TO/Towards a non-existent entity.
The argument goes from "Parental obligation to ensure the health of their future unborn child" to "The indirect/impersonal parental obligation to not create a child who is below a certain health threshold". This seems somewhat fair, as I think I was basically arguing for a form of impersonal obligation (Parental obligation towards the amorphous possible future child) via a mix of causal and voluntarism backing theories around parental obligation. Specifically my idea was that obligations attached to being a future parent appear once a couple has voluntarily taken up the project of bearing a child, but only have obligations towards A born child (aka whoever ends up being born at the end of this process), and reasonable obligations towards any fetus they decide to bring to full birth (they can turn away from this project at any time, or the particular fetus at any time, as I want to ensure the right to abortion was permissible within my framework). This makes it so the parents have obligation towards the health of A born child, it frees them/covers off against the ideas that genetic testing doesn't benefit any particular person (usually you ignore/abort a fetus with a disease rather than curing it)). While voluntary taking up is necessary for obligations, there is also a causal element in that the parents are the ones creating the child that I think are important, the obligation stems from being causally connected, but during prenatal and natal stages the obligations are voluntary because the project is voluntary.
However, due to this metaphysical wrench thrown in my plans, this no longer seems like an argument I can make, as parental theories backing/my argument is based on can't apply as they are centered around directed obligation towards a specific existent someone, and my idea of an "obligation to A born child" doesn't work because its a directed obligation to a non-existent someone.
Unfortunately, a medical situation has forced my advisor to take medical leave for the rest of the year, and had to cancel day of our second meeting where he was going to help me work through how to reword my arguments and what research was now invalid for me to us + what other research I now had to look into (The Non-Identity Problem). I also still have this gut feeling, even having looked into the non-identity problem that my above argument (obligation to A born child, whoever ends up being born) seems possible and defendable, but I'm not knowledgeable enough in this field.
Any advice or ideas would be deeply appreciated! As I've had to stop actually writing my paper to now sorting out this metaphysical wrench my professor has thrown into my gears (and then walked away without helping /lh)
TLDR: My argument was about a parental obligation towards whatever child ends up being born, but this doesn't metaphysically work due to the non-identity problem. I'm now trying to figure out how to reword my argument and what research/backing I now need to do with this (somewhat slight) direction change