A Program Full of Nationalism

It remains unclear how the Serbian student movement will govern. However, its foreign policy platform does not bode well for the Balkans.

In Serbia’s parliamentary election, which drove longtime Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić from power and may even have marked the beginning of the end of his political career, domestic issues came first, second, and third. Foreign policy played no role in the campaign, at least for the victorious “Student List” and its electorate. Yet foreign policy questions will soon come crashing down on a new Serbian government. And what is known about the student movement’s foreign policy program bodes ill for the region.

On key issues, this program follows seamlessly in the footsteps of Vučić’s Serbian nationalism and that of his defeated Progressive Party. It is a document looking backward. An attempt to implement it would inevitably fuel conflicts in the region.

The fact that the students do not recognize Kosovo’s independence is hardly surprising. This position is even enshrined in the preamble to the Serbian Constitution. But the student movement goes further: it seems unwilling to acknowledge even the very existence of Kosovo as a state. Its program sounds as though a government in Belgrade could act as it pleased anywhere in Kosovo.

For Serbia’s Students, Kosovo Is a “So-Called Republic”

The program published on the movement’s website states that they will fight to keep Kosovo within Serbia. It leaves open the question of how this fight is supposed to be waged.

The former Serbian province is referred to only as a “so-called republic”:

“We will consistently oppose the unilaterally declared independence of the so-called Republic of Kosovo and will not allow it to join international organizations.”

Apparently, the movement even wants to reverse progress that has already been made. Referring to the Serbian-Kosovar agreement on normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina, concluded in 2023 under Vučić’s rule with EU mediation, the program states:

“We will prosecute all responsible representatives of the regime for any and all potential criminal offenses related to the conclusion and implementation of unconstitutional agreements to Serbia’s detriment.”

The movement apparently wants to reverse Kosovo’s statehood. From the perspective of the Serbian student movement, there is no democratically elected government in Kosovo. Instead, it refers to “provisional self-governing institutions” in Pristina.

Even the Serbian university in Kosovska Mitrovica, located in the densely Serb-populated north of Kosovo, is described in the students’ terminology as being based there only “provisionally.”

Why provisionally? Because they want to move it back to the capital, Pristina? Without consulting the Kosovar government? How is that supposed to work?

The student movement’s claim to decision-making authority in Kosovo could be realized only through war.

On Kosovo, the student movement relies on its “traditional partnership” with Russia to “resolve outstanding issues of mutual interest.” Accordingly, it rejects the imposition of sanctions against Russia:

“The Republic of Serbia will maintain its fundamental position of not imposing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation.”

Instead, the movement seeks a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China, which it intends to expand further, particularly in infrastructure and high-tech investment.

Solidarity with Palestine, but Silence on Srebrenica

The student movement also takes a clear position on Israel. The relevant section begins with the sentence:

“Our people know very well what it means to be victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing.”

The conclusion is as follows:

“Accordingly, we will not make ourselves complicit in Israel’s systematic attempt to annihilate the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. We will increase the delivery of humanitarian aid to Palestine in order to save lives and reduce the number of victims.”

Serbian students are not alone in Europe in their outrage over Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians. However, the question is how credible such outrage can be when it comes from a movement whose understanding of its own country’s history and crimes consists above all of a collection of glaring blind spots.

The movement, which claims that the Serbian people know very well what it means to be victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing, has not said a single word about the burial of Serbian war criminal Ratko Mladić with full military honors in Belgrade.

It held a nationalist rally to mark the anniversary of the medieval Battle of Kosovo, yet remained silent on the anniversary of the genocide committed by Serbs at Srebrenica in 1995.

All of this provides further evidence of the historical outlook of a generation that has absorbed more of the nationalist atmosphere of Vučić’s years in power than it realizes.

An election manifesto is not yet a policy. Perhaps coming to power will also bring pragmatism.

But if what is written in the program really does represent the students’ foreign policy, Croatia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the majority population in Bosnia will probably have to join forces in some form against such a Serbia.

They will have to stand together against a country that views itself, its past, and its neighbors with such profound historical blindness.

The result would not be Serbia’s liberation, but its isolation.