My own project, public, CC-BY-4.0, every row links the guidance filing and the result filing on EDGAR. 15 US companies across six sectors, 1,309 guidance statements from 8-K earnings releases, 2019 to 2026.

734 have a checkable outcome. 223 landed inside the guide. 511 did not: 401 better than guided, 110 worse. Of the 110, 79 were more than 1% beyond the guide and 52 more than 5%. I then searched every later filing for a sentence referring back to the guide. None of the 110 was ever mentioned. The five acknowledgements that exist are all one company, Target, all EPS beats in fiscal 2023, each saying the result was above the high end of the guidance range. When it misses, it writes nothing.

Method: an LLM extracted each guidance figure from the release text into metric, period and range; code checks rejected the obvious errors, and I read every row by hand. The write-up counts what the model got wrong, including four acknowledgement false matches I removed last week. Segment figures and growth rates without a level are excluded on purpose, which is why Walmart has no comp-sales rows.

Page: https://huggingface.co/spaces/Nav772/assumption-drift
Write-up and code: https://github.com/Algo-nav/assumption-drift

The definition of “acknowledged” is strict by design. I would like it attacked: pick a row and tell me where the match is wrong.

And a question for anyone who does this for a living, on a research team or alone: when a company you cover misses its own guide, where does that fact live a year later? A spreadsheet, a note, the model, someone’s memory? I built this because I could not find it in the filings, and I would like to know whether it exists anywhere else.

Meta priced $25B of common at $625 and $12.5B of 6.5% mandatory convertible preferred on Monday, with an at-the-market program of up to $60B planned from early 2027. I wanted to see what the current price needs, so I ran a simple reverse DCF.

The cash picture

Q3 alone: FCF of –$2.1B. Full-year 2026 capex guide is $135–145B, so Q4 capex is implied at roughly $49–59B. Net cash (cash and securities minus long-term debt) went from ~$22.9B at end-2025 to ~$1.5B on Sep 30.

Reverse DCF

Inputs: $630.56 price, 2.573B diluted shares, EV ~$1.62T, starting FCF $43.6B (2025), 10 years, 3% terminal growth. Finance lease liabilities and the new shares are not included.

• 8% discount rate: ~10.5% FCF growth per year
• 9%: ~13.1%
• 10%: ~15.5%

At 9%, that’s ~$149B of FCF in year 10. For context, FCF fell in 2025 and is far lower in 2026.

The bull case

Q3 revenue grew 26% to $64.6B, price per ad +14%, impressions +10%, and headcount is down 15% y/y. If AI keeps pushing ad pricing, operating cash flow (already ~$130B run rate) can grow into the capex. Selling stock at ~21x trailing earnings instead of borrowing more can be a reasonable choice.

The bear case

Capex roughly doubled in a year and has no stated ceiling for 2027. Shareholders get ~6% more shares if the whole plan runs, right after five years of buybacks done at lower prices. Trailing P/E (21.5) looks cheap, but the cash yield doesn’t: about 2.7% on 2025 FCF.

TLDR: Costco in 2025, Marriott this past July and now KFC have announced they are switching to Coke. The article says it is no big deal since KFC doesnt represent much for Pepsi's business. I listened to Pepsi's concall recently, and was not impressed by management canned answers to analysts. I keep telling myself at some price Pepsi is a buy, but i don't think we are there yet. Disclosure: i have some Coca-Cola shares in a friend's account that i am advising.

https://www.barrons.com/articles/kfc-pepsi-coke-stock-yum-beverages-1230c432

KFC Is ditching Pepsi. Why It Fell Flat With Investors.

By Evie Liu

Oct 15, 2026, 5:55 pm EDT

KFC was once owned by PepsiCo, and has used the beverage for decades. (Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images)

Key Points

About This Summary

• KFC is ending its decadeslong relationship with PepsiCo in the U.S. and will switch to Coca-Cola products starting in January 2027.
• PepsiCo shares fell 0.7% and Coca-Cola gained 0.2% on Thursday, reflecting a subdued stock market response to the announcement.
• The loss of KFC’s U.S. business comes as PepsiCo struggles to revive North American beverage demand, where organic revenue growth recently stalled.

KFC is ending its decadeslong relationship with PepsiCo in the U.S. and switching to Coca-Cola. The deal marks a notable victory in the long-running cola wars, but the stock market’s response was subdued.

KFC announced Thursday that it will begin replacing PepsiCo beverages with Coca-Cola products at its roughly 3,500 U.S. restaurants in January 2027, with the transition expected to be completed by spring. The companies didn’t disclose the financial terms of the agreement.

The announcement marks a historic break between two companies with deep ties. PepsiCo acquired KFC in 1986 and continued supplying its beverages after spinning off its restaurant business in 1997.

Yet investors appeared largely unfazed by the change. PepsiCo shares fell 0.7% Thursday, while Coca-Cola gained just 0.2%. Yum! Brands, KFC’s parent company, was up about 2.8%, although other major restaurant stocks also rallied Thursday.

One reason for the limited reaction among the beverage giants is that KFC’s business represents only a small fraction of PepsiCo’s overall sales.

PepsiCo doesn’t disclose how much revenue comes from supplying individual restaurant chains or the entire food service segment. But public data could provide some ballpark estimates.

KFC generated $36.4 billion in global systemwide sales in 2025, with the U.S. accounting for just 12% of the total. That translates to roughly $4.4 billion in its U.S. restaurant sales. But only a portion of that comes from beverages, and PepsiCo receives the wholesale revenue from supplying those drinks—not the prices customers pay at restaurants.

That means the loss of a household-name customer may not translate into a meaningful hit to PepsiCo’s $28.2 billion beverage sales in North America. PepsiCo’s total annual revenue, including its North American food business and international food and beverage operations, was nearly $94 billion in 2025.

PepsiCo will continue supplying beverages to KFC’s international operations and to Taco Bell, which is also owned by Yum! Brands, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Still, the loss carries symbolic weight for PepsiCo. The company has been struggling to revive demand for its beverages in North America, where organic revenue growth stalled in the latest quarter, slowing from 1% in the previous quarter and 2% at the beginning of the year.

“We are not competing well in soft drinks,” CEO Ramon Laguarta said during PepsiCo’s third-quarter earnings call last week.

For KFC, the new partnership is also far from a guaranteed turnaround. Its U.S. system sales declined 2% in the second quarter, underscoring the challenge of winning back customers in a fiercely competitive chicken market.

KFC said it plans to use Coca-Cola’s extensive beverage portfolio and product innovation capabilities to develop new drink offerings, create more food-and-beverage combinations, and give customers more reasons to visit.

The move is part of what KFC calls its “Kentucky Fried Comeback,” an effort to revive its struggling U.S. business. The chain has been experimenting with new beverages, including iced coffees, boba drinks, and shakes, at its Open House test restaurant in McKinney, Texas.

“This partnership is about more than what’s in the cup,” said Catherine Tan-Gillespie, president of KFC U.S., in a statement.

Disclosure. I wrote this with AI assistance (Claude) and checked the figures against company releases, FCC orders and Treasury data; links at the end. VZ, T and TMUS: I hold no position in any of them. This is a hypothesis I'm tracking, not investment advice. I'm after critique of the reasoning, not upvotes. I wrote it on 11-12 October from data as of the 9 October close; prices have moved since, so check current ones.

Hypothesis. Over 90 days, from the 12 October close (my entry) to the 11 January 2027 close, a basket of Verizon (40%), AT&T (40%) and T-Mobile (20%) beats the S&P 500 by at least 5 percentage points on price return, as the 9 October selloff partly reverses.

Why now. On 8 Oct SpaceX agreed to buy Grain Management's nationwide 800 MHz licences (up to 14 MHz paired; price undisclosed, the WSJ reported $8bn in cash; FCC approval needed). On 9 Oct T-Mobile fell 13.3%, AT&T 10.8% and Verizon 10.1%, while the S&P rose 0.6%. About 1.1 and 1.5 points of the AT&T and Verizon moves were the dividend going ex that day.

What the market may be missing. A 2027 event priced into 2026 stocks:

• SpaceX itself expects Starlink Mobile service around the end of 2027, and the FCC ties its authority over the EchoStar spectrum to a closing expected around 30 Nov 2027.
• The Grain licences carry FCC dates: partner selection by 5 Nov 2026, satellite applications by 4 Dec 2026, terrestrial build-out milestones in 2029 and 2034.
• Scotiabank cut price targets only 2-4% and left 2026-28 estimates unchanged while the stocks fell 10-13%. One analyst, not consensus.
• In July Verizon raised 2026 free-cash-flow guidance to $21.94-22.14bn and T-Mobile raised adjusted FCF to $18.4-18.8bn. AT&T reiterated $18bn+ and plans about $10bn of buybacks, roughly 6.6% of its post-drop market value.

Best bear case. The stocks are being re-rated on long-run value, and good quarters don't reverse that. More SpaceX milestones land inside the window. The 10-year is at 5.24%, so Verizon's 6.8% dividend yield is only about 1.6 points over Treasuries, with $128.7bn of net unsecured debt. AT&T's net debt was $126.4bn before it paid about $23bn in cash for EchoStar spectrum. Verizon guides wireless service revenue roughly flat, and T-Mobile's FCF raise came mainly from lower cash taxes.

Valuation.

At a 9-10% required return (my assumption), a 12% FCF yield implies free cash flow shrinking 2-4% a year forever. Guidance is for growth. That may turn out right, but it is already priced.

Catalysts. AT&T Q3 on 21 Oct (pre-market), Verizon on 26 Oct, T-Mobile on 28 Oct (after the close; it has guided a soft Q3, about 250k account adds), FOMC on 28 Oct, Grain's FCC notice on 5 Nov.

What would prove me wrong.

1. Any of the three cuts 2026 FCF guidance at Q3, or Verizon or AT&T post negative postpaid phone net adds.
2. SpaceX publishes Starlink Mobile pricing or a launch date before end-2027.
3. After all three have reported, VZ closes below $37.50 and T below $20.00 on or after 6 Nov.

Weighting. T-Mobile is only 20% because it has the highest multiple, the thinnest dividend, a Q3 it has guided soft, and it sold its 800 MHz licences to Grain for $2.9bn in cash plus Grain's 600 MHz licences; SpaceX has now agreed to buy that band for a reported $8bn (not a like-for-like comparison).

Question. What is the weakest assumption here, and would you change any of the three conditions that would prove me wrong?

Sources. Primary: FCC order DA 26-653 (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-653A1.pdf); Verizon Q2 release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000732712/000073271226000040/a2026q2exhibit99.htm); AT&T Q2 release (https://about.att.com/story/2026/2q-earnings.html); T-Mobile Q2 release (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001283699/000128369926000100/tmus06302026ex991.htm); US Treasury yield data (https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value_month=202610). Press, cited by name only: Reuters on the deal; Forbes for the WSJ's $8bn report; Satellite Today on the FCC order on Starlink satellites; Benzinga on the Scotiabank note. Prices: stockanalysis.com closes for 8-9 Oct.

Mercado Libre's credit business is talked about a lot. So we did some research and analysis. We looked at its credit portfolio composition (across product and geography), loan duration, exposure per user, funding model etc. We also benchmarked MELI's credit risk and returns, against Nubank across key metrics such as net-interest income margin after losses. Attached post has all the charts and good stuff

Key takeaways from the analysis:

• MELI’s unsecured credit portfolio has significant exposure to higher-risk borrowers. MELI’s >90-day past-due loans have remained between 17–19% of its gross loan portfolio since Q4 2023, versus 6–7% at NuBank. Its credit portfolio is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. During the period of elevated inflation in 2022–23, MELI’s >90-day past-due ratio increased sharply, reaching 30% in Q4 2022 and 28% in Q1 2023
• That higher risk has been compensated by higher pricing, resulting in attractive returns in recent years. MELI generated a 59% annualized credit revenue yield in Q2 26, versus 38% for NuBank
• MELI’s loan durations are very short (~3 months on average). This is an advantage, as it gives MELI greater flexibility to adjust credit availability and pricing as conditions change
• However, questions remain about the sustainability of returns. MELI’s credit business has not been proven over time across different economic cycles. In adverse economic conditions, MELI could see a material uptick in credit losses, while loan originations could slow
• MELI’s recent margin pressure is not a major concern to us. A material portion is driven by provision expense, which is an accounting measure that can exceed realized losses and non-performing loans. This is amplified by MELI’s focus on credit card expansion, where provisions are incurred upfront, while interest income builds up slowly as customers mature and begin carrying balances. As the credit card business matures, interest income should build and support margins

Hope you find it useful, and would appreciate any feedback

On October 5, BioNexus Gene Lab (BGLC) signed an agreement with Ruanyun Edai Technology (RYET) for an exclusive Malaysian healthcare licence to CogniAI, RYET’s document-intelligence platform. BGLC says its first target is Malaysia’s public healthcare digitalisation programme, but it has no government contract. The $3.5 million figure in coverage describes something narrower than a cash price.

What the filing says (8-K filed 2026-10-07, accession 0001477932-26-006075, Items 1.01 and 3.02, full agreement attached as Ex. 10.1)

• Licence payment: 410,000 new BGLC shares at closing for a “stated” US$3.5M licence consideration. No cash. The 8-K and clause 2.5 of the agreement both say the figure is not a statement of fair value.
• Share swap: BGLC issues another 150,000 shares in exchange for 500,000 RYET shares. The 8-K says this is separate from the licence consideration.
• Fixed share count: there are no price resets, top-ups or market-value guarantee. The count adjusts only for splits or consolidations.
• Royalty: 10% of technology receipts BGLC actually collects. No minimum and no platform fee. Testing, clinical and separate service fees are excluded.
• Term: 10 years from closing, plus two optional 5-year renewals. There are no exclusivity milestones unless both sides sign some later.

The $3.5M is a label, not a price

$3.5M ÷ 410,000 shares ≈ $8.54 per BGLC share. BGLC closed at $1.27 today, so the licence shares are worth about $521k, and the stated price is about 6.7× the market. At $1.27, BGLC’s entire market cap is about $3.73M, so the “$3.5M” licence fee is about 94% of what the market values the whole company at. What RYET actually receives is whatever those shares fetch when it can sell them. The shares are restricted under Regulation S, and the agreement gives RYET no registration rights.

Dilution

BGLC’s Q2 10-Q cover page reports 2,933,442 shares outstanding as of August 14, 2026. The 560,000 new shares are 19.1% of that count, just under Nasdaq’s 20% shareholder-approval threshold. The agreement makes shareholder approval a condition only if law or exchange rules require it. The licence shares alone are 14.0%.

This comes on top of earlier issuance. The cover-page share count was 1,796,507 on the November 2025 10-Q, so it has already risen 63% before this deal. If the deal closes, the count will be about 3.49M, roughly 94% above November 2025.

Closing is the open question

No shares are issued until closing. The timeline:

• RYET must deliver the technology by December 4, 2026.
• BGLC then has 30 business days to test it. RYET gets 20 business days to fix any failures, and BGLC gets 15 to retest.
• If the technology fails a second time, BGLC can terminate.
• Other conditions include mutual due diligence, corporate and exchange approvals, and any approval RYET needs under its own law to license the technology. The press release lists PRC technology-export approval as a risk.
• If closing hasn’t happened by March 31, 2027, a party that isn’t in default can terminate unless both sides extend.
• If the deal terminates before closing, no shares are issued.

For context, RYET is a K-12 education technology company based in Nanchang, China. It reported about $1.73M of unaudited contracted activity for CogniAI as of June 2026.

I’ll be watching for a follow-up 8-K reporting either the closing and the share issuance, or termination (Item 1.02).

Filings:

• 8-K: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737523/000147793226006075/0001477932-26-006075-index.htm
• Q2 2026 10-Q (share count): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737523/000147793226005093/0001477932-26-005093-index.htm

For anyone who tracks small-cap licence deals paid in stock: how often do they close on the terms first announced, and how often does the long-stop date get extended?