https://aje.news/kzhmfu

Their weather naturally cooler or people in these 2 countries don't go start fire in forest?

Good day, everyone!

I am Paul Onil Agripa Valmadrid, a 5th-year Bachelor of Science in Architecture student at National University – Baliwag, Philippines. I am currently conducting my undergraduate thesis research titled:

"ASEAN Training and Convention Center: An Architectural Response to Strengthening Professional Collaboration and Regional Engagement in Clark Freeport Zone"

Purpose of the Study:

This study examines spatial programming, regional mobility, facility requirements, and cross-border collaboration patterns for professionals under the 8 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs)—including Architecture, Engineering, Healthcare, Tourism, Accountancy, and Surveying—as well as event organizers and convention delegates.

https://forms.gle/44ZpspE3QWWfcv2s6
https://forms.gle/44ZpspE3QWWfcv2s6
https://forms.gle/44ZpspE3QWWfcv2s6

How You Can Help:

If you are a registered professional, event organizer, CPD provider, or someone who frequently attends regional ASEAN conventions and international summits, I would be extremely grateful if you could spend 3–5 minutes completing this brief online survey.

Data Privacy & Confidentiality:

Your participation is completely voluntary. All collected data will remain strictly confidential and will be utilized solely for academic research and thesis documentation.

Note: At the end of the form, there is an optional section if you would be open to participating in a brief follow-up interview to share deeper insights on regional convention facilities.

Thank you very much for your time and support for architectural research in the ASEAN region!

Ma. Theresa Lazaro said that the bloc wants to see more progress on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus for resolving the country’s conflict.

Written after sitting through a cadre training session on environmental law, constitutionalism, and ecocentrism led by a constitutional law scholar at Universitas Brawijaya (Indonesia), namely its dean, Dr. Aan Eko Widiarto. Sharing because the overlap with left ecological politics surprised me, and I think it's worth putting in front of people who don't usually read Islamic political thought.

I'm a law student and cadre in HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), Indonesia's oldest Islamic student organization, founded in 1947. I'm not here to sell anyone on the org itself — plenty about it is contested, and it's not a socialist organization by any stretch. But its founding ideological document, the Nilai Dasar Perjuangan (NDP, "Basic Values of Struggle"), written in 1969–71 by the modernist thinker Nurcholish Madjid, has a few chapters that land closer to ecosocialist and rights-of-nature thinking than you'd expect from something drafted by a campus religious org during the Cold War. I want to walk through why, because the underlying argument — that unlimited power, whether state, capital, or human dominion over nature, needs a hard external check — is one the left has been making for over a century, just with different vocabulary.

The problem: extraction dressed up as stewardship

Mainstream environmental law in Indonesia (and most places) is built on anthropocentrism: nature as a resource pool for human — really, capital's — use. That framework has produced exactly what you'd predict: deforestation for palm oil, mining concessions carved out of Indigenous land, and a constitutional right to a "good and healthy environment" (Article 28H, Indonesia's Bill of Rights) that mostly exists on paper while extractive industry keeps winning in practice.

Ecocentrism, following Aldo Leopold's land ethic, flips this: nature has intrinsic value independent of its use to humans. Some jurisdictions have taken this further than rhetoric — Ecuador and Bolivia have constitutionally recognized rights of nature, and legal scholars like Christopher Stone made the case decades ago that ecosystems should have standing to sue. Indonesia's Constitutional Court gestured toward this in a 2021 ruling calling environmental protection a constitutional imperative, not just a policy preference. Jimly Asshiddiqie, a former Chief Justice, calls this trajectory "green constitution" — the idea that a constitution isn't neutral ground for capital to do whatever's profitable; it actively limits what the state and market are allowed to do to the ecological commons.

That's the legal frame. Here's where the religious document gets interesting.

"Stewardship, not ownership" — and why that's not just a nicer way of saying private property

Chapter II of the NDP HMI works from two Quranic concepts: humans as khalifah fil ardh (stewards/trustees of the earth, (6:165) and humans as beings whose entire purpose is service, not domination. The stewardship framing gets misused constantly — "God gave humans dominion" is a line that's justified plenty of ecological destruction across multiple religious traditions. But read carefully, trusteeship is the opposite of ownership: a trustee doesn't get to liquidate the estate. They're accountable to someone else for how it's managed, and that accountability isn't negotiable against short-term profit. It's a moral floor that can't be repealed by a shareholder vote or a mining permit. In the NDP's language this accountability runs "vertically" to God rather than horizontally to future generations or ecosystems directly — different metaphysics, same practical output as ecocentrism: an external, non-market check on exploitation.

Redistribution and intergenerational justice

Chapter V of the NDP frames humans as inescapably social — the questions it poses are literally "where, with whom, and how should I live" — and Chapter VI extends that into a mandate for social and economic justice: resources distributed fairly, without discrimination, as a matter of principle rather than charity. Extend "who counts as part of the community" across time instead of just across a single generation, and you land on intergenerational justice — the same logic underlying "we're stealing from our kids' future" climate arguments, except the NDP got there via a redistribution framework that's structurally closer to material justice than to individual virtue ethics. It's not "recycle because it's good for your soul." It's "resources are collectively owed, and hoarding or depleting them for one generation's benefit is a justice violation" — language a lot closer to ecological debt and just transition framing than to consumer-choice environmentalism.

A 7th-century precedent for limiting the state

The last piece worth flagging is the Constitution of Medina (622 CE) — genuinely one of the earliest written documents constraining a ruler's authority through multilateral agreement rather than unilateral decree. Two things stand out. First, the Prophet's authority in Medina was contractually bound to the city's diverse communities, including Jewish tribes like Banu Awf — not an absolute mandate. Second, non-Muslim communities explicitly retained their religion and property under the agreement while being full members of one political community (umma wahida) with shared collective obligations, including mutual defense.

Pull that principle forward: a state's authority over natural resources — like a ruler's authority over subjects — shouldn't rest on unilateral discretion, whether that discretion belongs to a government agency or an extractive corporation holding a concession. And the right to a livable environment isn't the property of whichever religious or ethnic majority happens to hold state power at a given moment; it's a collective right held by everyone inside the political community, full stop. That's not a foreign import into this tradition — it's arguably the tradition's founding document.

Why I'm posting this here

None of this makes a 1970s campus Islamic org's ideology "secretly socialist" — it isn't, and I'm not trying to launder that. But there's a real convergence worth naming: both traditions independently arrive at the position that concentrated, unaccountable power — over people or over ecosystems — has to be checked by something external to profit and to the state's own discretion, and that resources held in common are owed collectively, not extracted for whoever's currently positioned to extract them. If you're organizing around ecological justice and assume religious political thought has nothing to offer that argument, this is a data point against that assumption.

In Singapore, some offenders, including non-violent ones such as vandals, can be hit with a rattan cane as a penalty.

Caning in judicial and school contexts is very problematic due to multiple reasons. First, it is gender discriminatory since it only applies to males. It also does not solves the root cause of wrongdoing, and inflicts long-term physical and likely psychological harm.

I am citing reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which unanimously agrees that judicial caning amounts to torture under international law.

I have created a petition to call for its abolition so you can check out: https://c.org/r4prQYq4hh

Sources:

1. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/23/hrw-submission-universal-periodic-review-singapore

2. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/11/human-rights-watch-submission-universal-periodic-review-singapore

3. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/singapore

4. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa36/002/2010/en

A clash in the South China Sea threatened to overshadow a meeting of Southeast Asian nations on Tuesday as the US condemned “dangerous” Chinese actions in the contested waterway.

The US statement came minutes after Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in the Philippines, where the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expected to tackle issues including civil war-torn Myanmar’s ongoing pariah status.

Rubio will meet his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on Wednesday on the sidelines of the ongoing ASEAN summit in Manila, a State Department official said.

The meeting comes against the backdrop of US condemnation of Beijing’s maneuvers in the contested South China Sea, and US President Donald Trump‘s claims that China meddled with American election data.

In an op-ed published Tuesday morning in the Philippines, Rubio touted Washington’s commitment “to freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia” and the regional defensive umbrella it has provided.

“This freedom is by no means guaranteed. If these waters were to fall under the control of a power willing to use trade as a geopolitical weapon, both the United States and the ASEAN states would face serious new threats to their sovereignty, security and economic future,” he wrote, in a clear allusion to China.

Beijing claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, a vital global trade route, despite an international ruling that its claims have no legal basis.

On Monday, Philippine and Chinese sailors clashed at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea in what was the first serious seaborne encounter in months.

Manila said China Coast Guard personnel had assaulted Filipino sailors near a beached vessel that serves as a garrison on the disputed shoal.

Beijing said the Philippines instigated the incident by sending men in small rubber boats to approach their vessel.

The clash cast further doubt on hopes for a long-sought Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China for the waterway, though China’s ambassador to Manila told local reporters Tuesday evening he believed a deal remained achievable by the end of the year.

The resumption of hostilities in another strategic waterway, the Strait of Hormuz, also looms large this week, as the rekindled war with Iran is placing traditional American allies under economic strain.

The import-dependent Philippines declared a national energy emergency in March and has been forced to cast an ever-wider net for fuel, including purchases of oil from Russia, whose Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will arrive Tuesday in Manila.

The week is expected to see renewed efforts towards regional energy security.

‘Back Into the Fold’

No issue facing ASEAN foreign ministers has been more fraught than how to reintegrate Myanmar, a member state formally excluded from such summits like this week’s since the country’s military junta seized power in 2021.

In May, the bloc’s leaders emerged from an emotional meeting in Cebu that ended with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos calling for a “fine-tuning” of a long-stalled five-point plan to end Myanmar’s bloody civil war.

Thailand, which shares a long border with Myanmar and hosts millions of its refugees, has led the push for full reintegration.

On Tuesday, in an interview with AFP, Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said he had asked fellow ASEAN ministers to think about “how we measure progress” at a recent meeting in Bangkok that included his Myanmar counterpart.

“Our point was that we have to be realistic,” he said. “It’s not going to happen overnight. Some progress will come incrementally.”

But other ASEAN states have shown little appetite for softening their stance after five fruitless years of pursuing the peace plan with little progress to show for it.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan told reporters in May that his country remained opposed to high-level talks while “oppression is still taking place.”

Thailand and Cambodia are bypassing the bloc’s own dispute mechanisms – which says everything about confidence in the ASEAN Way.

$300 billion worth of energy resources at stake.

In response, Cambodia triggered a dispute resolution process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The mechanism has only been used once before, in 2016 by Australia and Timor-Leste, allowing the parties to resolve a decades-long maritime dispute in just under two ​years.

The Thailand–Cambodia dispute also has its own long antecedents, and this latest move presents a new chapter. In December 2025, Cambodia formally asked the UN Security Council to take action after border clashes beginning in the middle of the year. While Cambodia has favoured seeking settlement through external mechanisms, Thailand prefers bilateral talks, as Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has stated.

Under the UNCLOS process, a five-member commission will be formed, with two members from Thailand and two from Cambodia. The four members will jointly select one chairperson, bringing the total to five. The conciliation commission will hear arguments from both sides and consider evidence before proposing a way to end the dispute. Any ruling will be non-binding, even though both countries are signatories to the Convention. This also means that Cambodia is not guaranteed a favourable outcome even if the process succeeds.

What it does guarantee is a formal, internationally recognised process with a defined timeline.

That Cambodia prefers this approach over ASEAN’s consensus process speaks volumes about confidence in regional mechanisms. That should be seen as a regional reality check: ASEAN member states are not fully convinced by the bloc’s mechanisms for intra-bloc disputes.

Neither party consulted ASEAN first as a primary mechanism. ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms principle known as the “ASEAN Way” rests on non-interference and consensus – allowing sovereignty protection but preventing binding resolution. The success of ASEAN as an institution builder has earned it its “centrality. Last month, Thailand decided to scrap a Memorandum of Understanding with Cambodia concerning their maritime disputes, including a framework for a joint marine resources management in the sea with an estimated $300 billion worth of energy resources at stake.In response, Cambodia triggered a dispute resolution process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The mechanism has only been used once before, in 2016 by Australia and Timor-Leste, allowing the parties to resolve a decades-long maritime dispute in just under two ​years.The Thailand–Cambodia dispute also has its own long antecedents, and this latest move presents a new chapter. In December 2025, Cambodia formally
asked the UN Security Council to take action after border clashes beginning in the middle of the year. While Cambodia has favoured seeking settlement through external mechanisms, Thailand prefers bilateral talks, as Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has stated.

Under the UNCLOS process, a five-member commission will be formed, with two members from Thailand and two from Cambodia. The four members will jointly select one chairperson, bringing the total to five. The conciliation commission will hear arguments from both sides and consider evidence before proposing a way to end the dispute. Any ruling will be non-binding, even though both countries are signatories to the Convention. This also means that Cambodia is not guaranteed a favourable outcome even if the process succeeds.ASEAN centrality, in this case, would function as convening authority, not resolution authority.What it does guarantee is a formal, internationally recognised process with a defined timeline.

That Cambodia prefers this approach over ASEAN’s consensus process speaks volumes about confidence in regional mechanisms. That should be seen as a regional reality check: ASEAN member states are not fully convinced by the bloc’s mechanisms for intra-bloc disputes.

Neither party consulted ASEAN first as a primary mechanism. ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms principle known as the “ASEAN Way” rests on non-interference and consensus – allowing sovereignty protection but preventing binding resolution. The success of ASEAN as an institution builder has earned it its “centrality” in the region. The ASEAN Way is also the bloc’s official anthem.

While emphasising the use of informal practices and norms, the ASEAN Way does not preclude third-party mediation to settle bilateral disputes. Malaysia and Indonesia have done so when deciding to go to the International Court of Justice to settle sovereignty over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan.

This leaves ASEAN as a platform when useful for member states’ interests – bypassed when it is not. It does not mean that ASEAN should abandon its ASEAN Way or claim to centrality – only that centrality itself needs to be refined.

Instead of claiming the bloc can resolve internal disputes through informality and consensus – a reality exposed by the Cambodia–Thailand pattern – ASEAN should position itself as the coordinating framework through external mechanisms, including UNCLOS, where solutions are implemented and legitimised. In practice, this means ASEAN should be the first call when disputes arise, not to resolve them unilaterally, but to convene the parties, identify appropriate mechanisms, and remain present throughout the process.

When Cambodia triggers UNCLOS, ASEAN should be coordinating alongside it – not watching from the sidelines. ASEAN centrality, in this case, would function as convening authority, not resolution authority.

As Khang Vu noted last year in The Interpreter, Thailand and Cambodia are close partners of the United States and China respectively, creating a risk of great-power intervention if ASEAN cannot mediate conflict internally. Washington and Beijing already played active roles in a ceasefire during a land border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand last year, leaving questions about ASEAN centrality.

While the UNCLOS conciliation between Thailand and Cambodia may take years and produce non-binding recommendations, it also poses a test for ASEAN’s credibility. That test will not be determined by whether it resolves the dispute, but by whether it remains relevant to the process.

The red and gold are the same pigment as the flag.

Home to around 700 million people, Southeast Asia has been one of the regions most affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Hello! I am a Filipino student taking BA Social Science with an Asian Studies course this 2nd semester at a state university. As part of our course, we are reaching out to build friendship with the people of Singapore. If you are interested, don’t hesitate to chat with me. I would love to connect!

#singapore #asean #singaporeyouth

Hello everyone I’m a university student from the Philippines and I’m looking for university friends from Singapore to connect and exchange cultures for our ASEAN Youth Connect. This is a culminating activity to which we are tasked to make friends with and show both our cultures. 💕

I cannot stress this enough, ASEAN needs to be more united. This is not some wishes or daydream of me, this is purely because the current geopolitical situation is forcing us to, and unless the current leadership of each ASEAN member states realise this, we are fated to be in an even worse situation than the EU is right now.

For context, the EU has been seen since the start of the Trump tarrifs as being weak due to how they are structured, and the current tensions on Greenland is a perfect example of why middle powers must band together. The current world order is nearing the point of collapse, and that's why we must move quickly. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in his speech "If we're not at the table, we are on the Menu". Here, he was referring to the middle powers, specifically NATO and EU member states excluding the US. Depending on how the Greenland issue gets resolved, at best this would end up with a deep distrust between the EU and the US, and at worst, the complete breakup of NATO, and with that, the current world order.

ASEAN is surrounded by major powers, China in the north, India in the west, and the US in the east. Despite the shortcomings of the EU, they are much more united and integrated than ASEAN in every single way. ASEAN, much like the EU, is a group of medium powers. Alone, we wouldn't be able to to do anything, especially against the juggernauts next door to us. Unless we become united, just like what Carney said, we will become food for them, unable to do anything. In a future war, unless we band together, we would be forced to pick a side, to fight in a war we have no interest in, to become a battlefield for them to fight their wars.

In my opinion, if we must. it would be better to form a tiered system for ASEAN, much like what Macron proposed for the EU. The lowest level being at the status similar to what ASEAN is right now, with the highest being a political, military and economic union. Veto powers should absolutely not be implemented or severely limited to specific stuff. The veto power has been proven to be the biggest hurdle to almost everything in the EU, making it hard for them to do many strategic decisions.

With the European Union in serious discussion about creating a unified EU military in light of the US essentially stepping back from militarily aidding it's allies, should ASEAN do something similar in creating a unified military for Southeast Asia?