Also looking at just what he did and no speculation on between November 1944 to May 1945.

Edit: Nuremberg*

So I know that during the Cold War the US had one of the largest navies in the world which was important to project military power and to deploy soldiers and aircraft via carriers.

But after revisiting an old comic called Tintin. and the Land of Black Gold it got me wondering.

During the Cold War era, did the US military have any special programs or projects in place to provide an alternative source of fuel for their ships, tanks, and aircraft?

I mean it makes sense if you think about it. Suppose something happened to their major oil supplies and sources, like they were destroyed or sabotaged. If war broke out then they wouldn't be able to operate their carriers to transport troops, vehicles, and equipment. And if the quote below from Tintin and the Land of the Black Gold comic is any indication, I'm sure people back then weren't unaware of the issue.

“Supposing war comes, breaks out tomorrow? Imagine what'll happen: ships, planes, tanks. The armed forces completely immobilized! Disaster!”

However, outside of the Synthetic Liquid Fuels program which was cancelled in 1953 and the decision to create a fleet of nuclear powered subs, I don't know if there were any attempts by the US military to create an alternative source of fuel for any of their vehicles.

Does anyone have any knowledge of this subject and if it was pursued during the course of the Cold War?

It occurs to me that the material I have read about the Maus doesn't discuss clearly how it was intended to be deployed, beyond mentioning its role as a breakthrough and anti-fortification tank. Presumably it would be in some version of the schwere Panzerabteilung?

Hello Hivemind,

I might be barking up the wrong tree with this one, so apologies in advance if that's the case. Very broadly, my understanding is the soviets embarked on two programmes for digital beamforming sonars in the 1980s. In 1980 they started work on the system for their nuclear boats - Irtysh-Amphora, opting for a spherical bow array architecture. Then in 1985 it stayed development on a conformal system - Lira - intended for their SSKs.

To my knowledge, the soviets had never produced a bow array of either architecture before, having previously used cylindrical systems instead. They were also trailing two existing lines of western development:

- In 1960 the US developed a spherical bow array with AN/BQS-6, still using mechanical steering, before switching to a digital beamforming array using the same architecture with AN/BQS-11(?) in 1974.

- Meanwhile, in 1966 the UK had jumped from a cylindrical to a conformal architecture with Sonar 2001, requiring digital beamforming from the outset.

Now my understanding is the US decision to persist with the spherical architecture was mainly in order to maintain commonality of systems, packaging, and modeling, rather than for any performance advantage over conformal arrays, as this period coincided with the decline in the use of active sonar by at least western SSNs.

Given the relatively parallel timelines for development of each system, what led the USSR to view as valuable the development of both architectures from scratch? What led them to reject the British approach of an all-conformal fleet, if they didn't have the commonality considerations of the US? Is it that Soviet subs continued to favour active sonar more than their NATO counterparts at this point?

Whatever the reason, both systems continue to see parallel development through the end of the USSR, with development work being continued by the Russian federation. The spherical Amphora array went into the Borei class and the Severodvinsk, but from Kazan onwards, the Russian Navy seems to be shifting to using conformal arrays for its future classes of submarines, both nuclear and conventional alike, with concept images for the post-Borei "Arcturus" class also all showing a conformal array, for what that's worth.

Do we understand why Russia decided that a conformal architecture now is workable? What led them to reconsider the spherical architecture, first on its SSNs and now on all future designs? Why did they only go down this path having developed both to maturity, despite the strains of the post-soviet economy?

Sorry again if I'm wildly misunderstanding this stuff.

Thanks in advance!

Hope you all have wonderful days :)

Are there any formally accepted ideas on effective organisation and tactics at the small-unit level that are commonly seen in modern-day insurgent/guerrilla groups?

I am referring to modern-day groups in Sudan, Myanmar, and Lebanon, etc...

Do these guys look similar to conventional armies at the small-unit level, or is it more asymmetric and suited to specific needs?

I am very ignorant on these topics, so I would love details!

From hindsight, I think it's easy to say that the US was going to defeat Iraq. But no matter how strong a country is, waging war across the globe to defeat a country with the intent to occupy it is no easy feat.

Could the initial invasion have gone badly if the US didn't manage their forces as they did? Could the Iraqi forces have held out longer if things were different? How impressive was the United States military to carry out this invasion?

Been trying to look for a good record for the loadout that US Marines had for their woodland kits in 2003. As I know that the early 2000's was a transitional period when it came towards uniforms and equipment.

A few days ago there was a hypothetical discussion about what measures the USSR could have taken in early 1941 to better prepare for Nazi Germany's attack. To continue that topic outside a hypothetical, what concrete means did the USSR have to mobilize its armed forces in the first 6 months of 1941? What measures were taken and what weren't?

What were the Red Army's mobilization requirements? I'll start us off with manpower, as equipment and munitions are their own can of worms.

According to the February '41 mobilization plan adopted for the Red Army (MP-41), the complete mobilization of the Red Army and navy would require the callup of 4.8 million men. Of these, some 3.5 million would be assigned to the western military districts to bring them up to full strength.

The Red Army's mobilization when Germany attacked was announced on 6/22 and began on 6/23. This was a partial mobilization and excluded several border military districts. The contingent initially called up was reservists with training born 1905-1918. By 7/1 a little fewer than 10 million men were called up from this group or 97% of the expected total.

Now, called up != deployed to one's unit, much less trained. It would take 10-14 days after mobilization began to complete the process, by which point wartime disruptions had thrown everything into confusion anyhow. But we can see that the basic task of calling up men and transporting them to their units could be accomplished within a few weeks.

Now, the head of the Red Army's Main Directorate for Manning and Staffing noted in September 1942 that:

The conscription of such a massive number of people across the entire territory of the USSR was not dictated by military-political necessity; it caused disorganization in the national economy and created unnecessary alarm among the general population.

Of the called up contingent, only 1/3 was needed to bring the western districts up to strength and 3/5 to fully mobilize the Red Army and begin creating new formations. I think it's reasonable to say that a smaller-scale mobilization would be preferable and an achievable goal.

French arms industry is famously very export oriented. After the Falkands war, did Exocet become a hot hyped thing and see an increase in demand? Or conversly, were any potential clients concerned with France cooperating and revealing specifications to their Western Allies such as Britain if things go hot?

A while back I made a post asking people here for their opinions on the Battle of Sekigahara, and I found the discussion quite interesting.

So this time I’m looking at one of the most famous victories of Oda Nobunaga, the Battle of Nagashino.

Often remembered as the battle in which firearms decisively defeated the supposedly invincible Takeda cavalry, Nagashino is easily one of the most famous battles in Japanese history, and perhaps one of the better known Japanese battles outside of Japan as well.

Now, I’ve always heard people discuss Nagashino in the context of Nobunaga’s innovative use of firearms, and the disastrous decision of Takeda Katsuyori to attack his fortified positions. But I’ve also come across arguments that the traditional story of thousands of cavalrymen charging headlong into three ranks of arquebusiers is something of an exaggeration, and that the battle was considerably more complicated than is often presented.

And that got me thinking, much like with Sekigahara, what would people with a better understanding of other periods as well as military history in general think of the battle? Particularly the decisions made by both commanders, and whether Nagashino really deserves its reputation as a revolutionary moment in military history.

The battle saw the combined armies of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu fight against the Takeda army under Takeda Katsuyori in 1575. Traditional estimates place the Oda-Tokugawa forces at roughly 38,000 men, against around 15,000 Takeda troops.

Katsuyori had invaded Mikawa Province and laid siege to Nagashino Castle, defended by a small Tokugawa garrison of roughly 500 men under Okudaira Sadamasa. With the defenders holding out, Nobunaga and Ieyasu assembled a large relief army and advanced towards the castle. Rather than attempt to confront the Takeda in open ground, the allies established a strong defensive position at Shitaragahara, a short distance west of Nagashino. Nobunaga deployed his troops along a roughly north-south line, with wooded hills protecting one flank and the Toyokawa River towards the other. The position was further strengthened by the Rengogawa stream running across its front, muddy ground, and extensive wooden palisades constructed to obstruct the attacking Takeda troops.

Nobunaga positioned large numbers of arquebusiers behind these defences, supported by spearmen and other infantry. According to the famous traditional account, he deployed approximately 3,000 arquebusiers in three rotating ranks, allowing them to maintain a continuous volume of fire. Although the precise number of firearms and the use of organised rotating volleys remain disputed, the concentration of firearms behind prepared defensive works was nevertheless an important feature of the allied position. Meanwhile, Katsuyori advanced with the bulk of his army to confront the relief force, leaving several thousand men to maintain the siege of Nagashino Castle. His commanders, including veterans who had served under his father Takeda Shingen, reportedly disagreed over whether to risk a pitched battle against the numerically superior enemy.

The fighting began early in the morning, as the Takeda advanced against the Oda-Tokugawa positions. Katsuyori’s forces launched repeated assaults across the Shitaragahara battlefield, attempting to break through the allied defensive line. The attackers had to negotiate the stream, uneven and muddy terrain, and wooden palisades while coming under heavy arquebus fire. The traditional account describes successive waves of Takeda cavalry being annihilated by disciplined volleys, although historians have questioned whether the attacks were predominantly mounted charges, with evidence suggesting that much of the fighting involved dismounted samurai and infantry. Nevertheless, the Takeda repeatedly pressed forward, with fierce fighting developing around the defensive barriers as attackers attempted to close with the Oda and Tokugawa troops.

Despite suffering heavy casualties, the Takeda continued their assaults for several hours. Commanders such as Yamagata Masakage, Naito Masatoyo and Sanada Nobutsuna were killed during the fighting, while the Oda-Tokugawa forces largely maintained their defensive positions. The combination of concentrated missile fire, difficult terrain and prepared obstacles made it extremely difficult for the attackers to exploit any local successes. Rather than defeating the enemy in a single devastating volley, the allied army gradually wore down the Takeda through repeated failed assaults and sustained fighting along the defensive line.

Meanwhile, another important development was taking place behind the Takeda army. Nobunaga and Ieyasu had dispatched a separate force under Sakai Tadatsugu, numbering several thousand men, to move through the surrounding hills and attack the Takeda positions around Nagashino Castle. Moving under cover of darkness, Sakai’s troops launched a surprise attack against the Takeda fortifications at Tobigasuyama, threatening the besieging forces and their communications. The operation succeeded in relieving pressure on the castle and placed the Takeda in an increasingly dangerous position, with their main army engaged against a numerically superior enemy while their rear was being attacked.

As the fighting continued, the Takeda assaults lost momentum and their formations began to disintegrate. With many of his most experienced commanders dead, mounting casualties and the situation around Nagashino deteriorating, Katsuyori eventually ordered a retreat. The withdrawal turned into a disastrous defeat, with the allied forces pursuing the retreating Takeda and inflicting further losses. Baba Nobuharu was among the senior commanders killed during the retreat. By the end of the battle, the Takeda had suffered enormous casualties, traditionally estimated at around 10,000 men, although the precise figure is uncertain. The defeat cost the clan much of its experienced military leadership and severely weakened its ability to challenge Nobunaga and Ieyasu, contributing to its eventual destruction in 1582.

How do you judge the plans of the two sides? Do you think Katsuyori’s decision to attack was as foolish as it is often portrayed, or was there a reasonable tactical justification for attempting to defeat the relief army before the siege collapsed? And how much credit should Nobunaga and Ieyasu receive for their defensive preparations, choice of terrain and the flanking operation against the Takeda rear?

I’m also particularly interested in how people would compare Nagashino to battles from other periods, especially regarding the effectiveness of field fortifications and firearms against an attacking enemy. Do you think there were things either side could’ve done better? Do you think there are things worthy of praise?

With Hybrid Warfare in Europe now playing out with new technologies like drones, cryptocurrencies, and the internet among other things at their disposal, there was a time in the Cold War when domestic extremist like the Germany Red Army Faction and other militants posed a security challenge. In hindsight, how useful were gendarmerie-style forces like the Carabinieri or Internal Troops were against what they were dealing with back then? What lessons are there from the past that is relevant?

I believe there are the MiG-29K (carrier jet) and the MiG-35 (kind of a vaporware plane). I think there are some subvariants and export variants.

Meanwhile, the Su-27 got the Su-30, Su-33 (carrier jet), Su-34 (double seat strike fighter), Su-35, plus subvariants like S/SM and export variants like MKI.

What was the reason for this? As far as I know, most nations' needs are for light to medium multirole fighters. It's one reason the F-16 is so popular, and one reason the J-10CE is creeping into Russia's export markets. So you'd think the MiG-29 would have received more emphasis. But it's mainly the Su-27 family.

I was able to find platoon and company HQs, but what is in the battalion HQ and HQ company, Brigade HQ and HQ company, and Division HQ and HQ battalion, how are the organized and how do they operate?

thanks!

For example, what shows or music did soldiers fighting the war on terror know of or get to watch “Over there”? How did the tech of the time connect them to life back in the states?

So, of course Allies landed in beaches in France and all that. They also had s major operation aimed to deceive the Germans of their landing plans, with fictional US 1st Army amd other deception measures and these deception measures definitely played huge dividends

But my question is,

>1) did allies planned to deceive Germans into believing that major landing may take place in Balkans?

My interest peaked after this video.

https://www.youtube.com/live/K-tDUID24ow

He talks about a major sucessful deception operation where two spies were dropped in Balkans with instructions to reveal that landing would take place in Balkans to the German interogattors.

My question is, was the German army posted there equipped enough to fend off such invasion, if the allies decided to pursue such invasion through Balkans?

Does Germans really solidified the defence in the aftermath of the incident as described in the video, in the Balkans to stop an amphibous invasion like they did with propping up Atlantic wall , which took a huge resources from Nazi Germany in 1944?

I know Balkans is like the worse place to mount an offence with mountaineous region, so,

>did Germans understood that it's highly unlikely to have a major invasion through Balkans landing amd thus no need to have a as robust defensive preparation as was going in Atlantic wall?

As I understand, Tito had already made Balkans highly unstable and thus, did Germans considered a air landing with weapons mixed a amphibious landing and an operation to have two forces join can make a major offensive operation possible or a sane, viable, possible strategy?

After all, when Soviets actually reached Balkan borders, the offensive to oust the Germans was comparatively easy with Partisans in able leadership of Tito making Germans fly away even before Soviets actually joined the fight. So, Germans may be thinking a landing possible there?

What was the status of forces posted in Balkans, to mount an effective counter against a possible major amphibious operation? How would such an operation, if happened, would turn out?

Please be kind enough to dive deep into my questions and answer in details. I have all the time in the world to read your analysis

People like to pick on Admiral Callaghan’s orders for being confusing at the first night battle of Guadalcanal - but at least he didn’t straight up derp into a Japanese torpedo spread like Wright did, losing a heavy cruiser and 3 others damaged all for one Japanese destroyer sunk.

I know Tassaforonga is a US strategic victory because the Japanese didn’t get to resupply their garrison but the fact that Wright was immediately sent back to a desk stateside shows how badly he screwed the pooch with what the original plan was for the US force.

I’m talking about admirals that only fought a single battle as admiral in charge of the local battle.

I how did both branch handle the poor cockpit ergonomic of the f4 phantom 2 during and post Vietnam.

And how they defer from each other.