동해 물과 백두산이 마르고 닳도록, 하느님이 보우하사 우리나라 만세.

무궁화 삼천리 화려 강산, 대한 사람 대한으로 길이 보전하세

남산 위에 저 소나무 철갑을 두른 듯 바람서리 불변함은 우리 기상일세.

Seoul and the provinces, March 1950

The polls opened in light March frost, with queues forming in the villages before dawn and men in their best coats standing patiently in them. Turnout was reported at about 92 per cent, which surprised even the Home Ministry and was taken in Seoul and elsewhere as a sign that the Republic's citizens were willing to vote at all in a year of border fighting and mobilisation exercises. A nation under siege was still willing to trust democracy. It was the first national election since the founding of the Republic and true independence, and the first since the Land Reform Act began putting deeds into tenants' hands. The result was clear enough, and a good deal more confusing than anyone had predicted.

210 seats up for grabs- 106 needed for a majority - turnout: 92%

Party	Seats	Share of vote
Independents	126	62.9%
Democratic Nationalist Party	24	9.8%
Korea Nationalist Party	24	9.7%
National Association (President Rhee)	14	6.8%
Korea Youth Party	10	3.3%
Ilmin Club	3	1.0%
Korean Federation of Trade Unions	3	1.7%
Socialist Party	2	1.3%
National Independence Federation	1	0.5%
Other parties	3	2.2%

The independents won a clear majority, and the President's own party took only fourteen seats, which the opposition at once called a defeat. Rhee's cadre's reading, offered by officials in the days afterwards, was that voters had sent a verdict on the politicians and not on Dr. Rhee.

Rhee had declined to lead a party campaign, and most of his supporters had stood without a label, as local men with local reputations. Reports from the counties were fairly consistent. In villages where the first land deeds had been handed out in the autumn, crowds still cheered for Dr. Rhee's name at rallies, and in several districts the successful candidate was known mainly as the man who would "stand with Rhee on the land".

The Democratic Nationalist Party and the Korea Nationalist Party, which had expected to profit from the Assembly's quarrels with the Government, tied at twenty-four seats each, and neither is close to a majority.

The Assembly that results is a numerous and unruly body, and its tensions were visible within a week. The outgoing Assembly's quarrels with the Government have not gone away. The dispute over land bonds, the memory of the veto and its override, the fifteen members arrested during the summer, and a standing complaint among members of every party that the Office of the President treats the legislature as a department of its own.

The Independents

The independents themselves are the unknown. They have no common platform, and the most that can be said is that they include everyone from landlords and their sons, tenants and their sons, former officials and a handful of men with close ties to the late Kim Ku, as well as a number who will not say for whom they voted.

The President's allies count perhaps sixty or seventy members who may vote with the Government on most questions. The opposition counts about the same on its own side, and every faction has begun courting the rest. Ministers have said, publicly, that the Government will work with whoever will work with it. Privately, officials say that the President's strategy is to continue as normal; being to go over the heads of the members, using his standing in the countryside to hold the Assembly to account.

Outside the chamber, the pressure is already felt. From the Communists to the Americans. They said the same things they have always had.

Throughout 1949 the Korean People's Army grew at a pace few thought possible. It went from around 75,000 men in four light infantry divisions and a border constabulary to a combined-arms army of over 200,000, with 13 infantry divisions and 2 tank brigades. The Air Force grew from a flying school into a division of five combat regiments, and the Navy was rebuilt into two coastal groups. By the end of January 1950 every branch of the armed forces had been raised, equipped and trained to regimental level, and the most experienced formations to divisional level.

The expansion was paid for in blood, sweat, and on the backs of the Korean people, with loans from the Soviet Union and support from our allies across the socialist camp. It was the end of the year that showed why it had to be done in such haste. With the fall of the Kuomintang, the Rhee clique invited thousands of Chiang Kai-shek's beaten soldiers onto the peninsula, as foreign armies have been invited in to dominate Korea for centuries. Then, unprovoked, the United States announced that it would arm the Republic of Korea with vast quantities of weapons, due to arrive by the summer.

Phases of Expansion

Foundation and Agreements

The plan for a modern People's Army was agreed with our Soviet advisers in December 1948, as the Soviet Twenty-Fifth Army withdrew from the North. Every step since has followed that plan and enlarged it. In January 1949 Choe Yong-gun and Kim Mu-bong travelled to Harbin to meet the Chinese comrades of the Northeast. They reached an agreement that the Koreans serving in the People's Liberation Army, both those the DPRK had sent north and those of Sino-Korean origin, would come home when the war in China was won.

From then the pace only quickened. In February the first large shipment of Soviet arms reached Wonsan: two and a half million rifle rounds, fifteen thousand shells, mortars, heavy machine guns and pistols. In March the leadership of the Republic went to Moscow and met Comrade Stalin, and a loan was agreed to fund the further expansion of the People's Army, along with tanks, artillery, aircraft and a larger Soviet advisory mission. In May, Kim Il, the army's chief political officer, went to Beijing. Chairman Mao and the Chinese leadership confirmed that the Korean divisions would return, and offered Chinese troops as well. The Government thanked them and declined. The defence and the future of Korea must be the work of Koreans.

These agreements, and those that followed with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, made the modernization of the People's Army possible. Shipments are still arriving through the winter as the last units finalize their transformation into a modern army.

Manpower and Recruitment

To fuel this growth, the men and women of the People's Army had to come from many sources. Most came from Korea itself. About 100,000 were brought in over the year as volunteers and conscripts and through the Party and the Youth League. After the general service law was passed, two call-ups in August and November brought the bulk of them into the standing army. Each intake was screened by the Party, and about a third were Party or Youth League members.

From China came about 80,000 more: veterans of the People's Liberation Army and recruits from the Korean communities of Manchuria. The last units arrived in the winter, once the war against the Kuomintang was won. The exact figure is still being counted, since some men came home in formed units and others in ones and twos across the Yalu, and the Ministry expects it to rise.

Not every man went to the field army. About 55,000 of the new intake went to the security troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the railway guards, the Air Force and Navy, the schools and the reserve cadres. That leaves the field army at just over 200,000.

On the border, the three Guard brigades that had held the parallel through a year of fighting were withdrawn, refitted and expanded into full divisions. Their hardened veterans became the backbone of the new units.

Behind the front, the army's drivers, mechanics, machinists and radio operators came from the factories, the mines and the railways. Some came from politically less reliable groups such as the members of the Christian League, who serve in the technical and labour units under close supervision. All of this is backed by a large reserve, with part-time military training now compulsory in factories, farms and schools for every man aged 18 to 35.

Ground Forces

Every infantry division of the People's Army is now organized on the Soviet pattern, with three infantry regiments. Each division also has an artillery regiment of 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers with its own battalion of SU-76 self-propelled guns, an anti-aircraft battalion with 37 mm guns and heavy machine guns, and engineer, signal, reconnaissance and medical battalions. A division at full strength has about 11,000 men. The veteran and ex-PLA divisions are at or near it, while the newest, the 10th and 14th, are still filling their ranks from the winter call-up.

The army reached thirteen divisions by building on what already existed. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions, the founding formations of the People's Army, were re-equipped and brought up to the new establishment. The 6th and 5th Divisions came home from China in July and August as the PLA 166th and 164th Divisions. They kept their men, their regiments and their battle experience, and changed only their senior officers and their uniforms. Pang Ho-san, who commanded the 166th through the Manchurian campaign, kept his men as the 6th. In October the 7th Division arrived from the PLA's 156th Division, and the Korean regiments of the PLA's Manchurian garrisons were gathered into the 11th. Over November and December the three Guard brigades became the 1st, 3rd and 7th Guard Divisions. The last returnees from China formed the 14th Division, and Korean irregulars back from China formed the 10th.

Training followed one program for every division, timed from the day it was formed. Conscripts spent their first six weeks at the divisional depots learning to shoot, throw grenades and dig in. Four weeks of squad and platoon training followed: fire and movement, moving at night, and assaulting prepared positions. Companies and battalions then trained for four to six weeks in attacks behind artillery and mortar fire, in river crossings, and in the reverse-slope defence that the 7th Guard Brigade had used so well on the Kaesong heights. The cycle ended with four weeks of regimental exercises, with tanks, SU-76s and artillery working together, long night marches, and whole regiments moved by rail.

The founding divisions and the first two from China finished the full cycle by October and took over the parallel from the Guard brigades in November. The rest finished regimental training by the end of January. The veterans from China needed little tactical training, having already fought from the Sungari to the Yangtze. What they needed was conversion to Soviet weapons and organization, staff work in Korean rather than Chinese, and practice working with tanks and heavy artillery, which the PLA rarely had. Most managed it in four to six weeks, though some of the older officers have struggled to give up Chinese habits.

The officer corps grew with the army. Under the March agreement, the Soviet Union opened its military schools to several hundred Korean officers. The most promising regimental and divisional commanders and staff officers went to the Soviet staff academies. Artillery, armour, signals and engineer officers went to the Soviet branch schools, where they learned their trades on the same equipment the People's Army was receiving. The first of them returned in the autumn and now hold key staff and technical posts across the army. At home, the Central Military Academy at Pyongyang ran six-month courses for platoon and company commanders and graduated two classes in 1949, taught partly by Soviet instructors and partly by officers back from the Soviet schools. Officers returning from the PLA with field experience were confirmed in command and then sent through staff courses. Before January 1950 every regimental and divisional commander had taken part in staff exercises with the Soviet mission. Every company has a political officer and holds political studies daily, stressing discipline toward civilians and loyalty to the Republic and the people.

Armoured Forces

In August 1949 the 15th Tank Training Regiment, which had trained Korean crews on Soviet tanks since 1948, was expanded into the 105th Tank Brigade under Major General Yu Kyong-su. The brigade has three tank regiments (the 107th, 109th and 203rd) of about forty T-34/85s each, and the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, whose infantry ride on the tanks or follow in trucks. Its crews are the most experienced in the army.

A second brigade, the 106th, was formed in September on the same model, with the 108th, 110th and 204th Tank Regiments and the 207th Mechanized Infantry Regiment. Its 125 T-34/85s were delivered from the Soviet Union over the autumn. Its officers and NCOs came from the 105th and from the tank school's 1949 classes, and its drivers and gunners from the PLA's vehicle units and the technical schools.

Tank training was run at the tank school by Soviet instructors. Crews learned driving, gunnery and maintenance before moving on to platoon and company manoeuvre. From November the tank regiments trained with the mechanized infantry and the rifle divisions they support, until riding on the tanks became routine. Both brigades fired a full gunnery course before January. Maintenance is another matter. One Soviet adviser complained in his report that the new drivers treat a T-34 like an ox cart, and the 106th's breakdown figures bear him out. Maintenance and recovery will be the focus of its training in 1950. Each infantry division also has its own battalion of SU-76 self-propelled guns, about 180 vehicles in all, trained with the divisional artillery.

Artillery, Anti-Aircraft and Engineers

The army now has over seven hundred field guns and howitzers. The divisional artillery regiments trained through the year in fire planning, counter-battery fire and firing over open sights at bunkers, the lessons of the 1949 border fighting. In November the 1st Guards Mortar Battalion was formed as part of the General Staff reserve with sixteen BM-13 rocket launchers, its crews trained by Soviet rocket-artillery instructors.

Protection from the air was built up from September to December. Every division received an anti-aircraft battalion. Three mobile anti-aircraft regiments were raised at army level to accompany the army in the field, and six static battalions now guard the Pyongyang, Sinmak, Pyonggang and Wonsan airfields, the port of Haeju and the rail junction at Chorwon. Together they have roughly 280 37 mm guns, 28 85 mm guns and about 500 heavy machine guns. Their crews trained against towed targets flown by the Air Force.

The two pontoon-bridge battalions formed in October were equipped with Soviet heavy pontoon parks. The bridge sections are pre-built and carried ready to assemble on trucks and rail flatcars, so a bridge can be put up wherever the army needs one, without waiting for timber or local materials. Through the autumn both battalions trained on the widest rivers in the North: the Taedong at Pyongyang, the Chongchon at Anju, and the Ryesong. Each exercise followed the same sequence. Infantry crossed first by assault boat to secure the far bank. Rafts then ferried over guns and vehicles. Finally the full bridge was swung into place, and tanks of the 105th Tank Brigade drove across under load. Most exercises were held at night, under blackout and with air attack simulated, because the General Staff expects enemy aircraft to make any daylight crossing costly.

It was not without cost. In November a raft on the Taedong overturned under a 76 mm gun and four men drowned, and since then every landing has had its load tables posted and checked by an officer. The first full crossing of the Taedong took most of a night. By the time the rivers froze in December, both battalions could put a bridge that would carry a T-34 across in under half that time, and take it down and hide it before dawn. The battalions also revived a method the Red Army used in the Great Patriotic War: the underwater bridge. On shallow, slow reaches of the Chongchon and the Taedong, engineers drove timber piles and laid a deck about a forearm’s depth below the surface, strong enough for a T-34 and shallow enough for a loaded truck. From the air the river looks untouched. Such a bridge takes several days to build, but once in place it can carry traffic for weeks without being seen. The engineers’ stated purpose is to keep the Republic’s armies moving if its own bridges are destroyed by air attack, and the drills will resume when the ice breaks up.

Equipment

Most of the army's heavy equipment came from the Soviet Union on credit. Further small arms and vehicles came from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The Republic paid in gold, silver and monazite, drawing part of the 1950 credit early.

The mechanized infantry carry the PPSh-41s, and the assault platoons of the infantry divisions carry the SVT-40s. The older Maxims, MG 08s and Schwarzlose guns, which take different ammunition, have gone to the garrisons, the coastal defences and the reserve.

Korean People's Army Air Force

At the start of 1949 the Air Force was little more than the flying school at Pyongyang and a few dozen trainers and liaison aircraft. By the end of the year it was the 1st Air Division, with five combat regiments and a training regiment. The 56th Fighter Regiment formed in June on the Yak-9 and the 57th Attack Regiment in July on the Il-10. They were followed by the 60th Fighter Regiment in October, the 59th Attack Regiment in November and the 61st Fighter Regiment in December. The 58th Training Regiment keeps the trainers, the liaison aircraft and a reserve of about 130 Il-2s.

The Air Force could not have been built at home alone. Under the March agreement, the Soviet Union accepted about 10,000 Koreans for training in Soviet aviation schools. They were assigned by need: about 1,500 as pilots, and the rest as aircraft mechanics, engine and armament fitters, radio operators, navigators, meteorologists, airfield and supply staff, and ground controllers. The first trainees left in the spring of 1949. They came from the flying school at Pyongyang, from Koreans who had flown or maintained aircraft for the Japanese or the Chinese forces, and from technical students and skilled workers chosen by the Party.

Courses have been shortened wherever possible. Pilots who already had flying experience, and ground crew who had worked on aircraft before, came home first, from the autumn of 1949, and formed the core of each new regiment. Captain Pak Il-chol, who flew transports for the Japanese in Manchuria during the war, was among the first back and now commands a squadron of the 56th. Soviet instructors flew with each regiment through its conversion to the Yak-9 or the Il-10. Training moved from formation flying to bombing and strafing on the ranges, attacks on airfields, and escort of the attack regiments.

By January 1950 about 450 pilots were qualified for combat. That is enough to man the fighter and attack regiments with reserves, and every regiment is served by Soviet-trained ground crews. The main class of new pilots will finish its courses in the spring, bringing the total to somewhere around 900 once failures are counted. Most of these new pilots will have few flying hours and no experience of formation or combat flying. Until they have gained that experience, the Il-2s are kept in reserve with the newest crews, while the Yak-9 and Il-10 regiments are flown by the most experienced pilots. At home, the flying school at Pyongyang continues to give new cadets their first instruction before they go on to the Soviet schools.

Each main airfield now has dispersal areas, camouflaged revetments and an anti-aircraft battalion of its own.

Navy

The Korean People's Navy grew out of the Maritime Security Force, founded at Wonsan in June 1946 as a coastal police force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In August 1949 it was placed under national defence command and rebuilt as a fighting navy under General Han Il-mu, with a senior Soviet naval adviser at his side. The ROK navy's raid on Monggumpo that same month showed how exposed the west coast had been, and it set the priorities for the rest of the year.

The fleet is now organized in three squadrons. The 1st Patrol Squadron operates OD-200 submarine chasers. The 2nd Torpedo Boat Squadron, based at Wonsan, operates G-5 motor torpedo boats, with a detachment rotated to Haeju to cover the west coast. The 3rd Minesweeper Squadron operates two former American and one former Japanese minesweeper. Alongside the squadrons are a floating base, a 2,000-ton transport, motor gunboats, and a growing number of new small patrol craft delivered over the year. A construction division is building further ships in the yards. In wartime, more than a hundred motor schooners and fishing craft can be taken into service as transports.

For operations, the craft are divided between two coastal groups. The West Coast Group, based at Haeju with Monggumpo being rebuilt, holds the minesweepers, gunboats, new patrol craft and the torpedo boat detachment, and guards the Ongjin and Haeju approaches against the raids that hurt it in 1949. The East Coast Group, based at Wonsan and Yangyang, holds the submarine chasers, the main torpedo boat force, the transport and the schooners.

Ashore, the Navy commands two naval infantry units formed in July 1949, the 945th at Wonsan and the 956th at Nampo, trained by Soviet advisers in landing operations. It also has a coastal artillery regiment and an anti-aircraft regiment of 37 mm and 85 mm guns covering the main naval bases. Its total strength is about 7,000: about 3,700 sailors, some 2,000 naval infantry and 1,100 coastal defence troops.

The naval school at Wonsan, founded in 1947, trains the Navy's officers with Soviet instructors. The torpedo boat crews were trained at Vladivostok. By the end of 1949 about 550 officers and 600 sailors had completed their courses. Training stressed night patrol and convoy escort, minelaying close to shore, and the gunnery and blockade work learned in the Ongjin convoy fighting of 1949. From October the East Coast Group trained alongside the 766th Independent Unit and the 549th Unit, the army's special operations troops.

The Soviet Advisory Mission

The Soviet mission grew with the army. Its advisers serve with the General Staff, the divisional headquarters, the tank brigades, the Air Force and the Navy, and its instructors teach at every school and training centre. They advise and instruct but do not command. The mission drew up the training program with the General Staff and ran the staff exercises in which every senior commander took part.

Readiness, January 1950

At the end of January the People's Army is, for the first time, stronger than the forces arrayed against the Republic in every arm. The work of 1950 is to complete the training of the 14th and 10th Divisions and the 106th Tank Brigade's maintenance crews, hold divisional exercises, and keep the army at full readiness to defend the Republic against any provocation from the South.

Statement by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai

Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China,

Beijing, February 1950

To the peoples and governments of the world:

Six months ago the Chinese people ended a century of humiliation. Chairman Mao Zedong told the world that “the Chinese people have stood up.” The imperialists who carved up our land and armed the Kuomintang reactionaries have not accepted this. They have changed their methods.

In the east, the United States has taken the defeated remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, shielded them with its Seventh Fleet and its dollars, and declared a so-called “independent Formosa.” Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times. No foreign power has the right to manufacture a puppet state there. In the northeast, Washington has sent shiploads of weapons to the Syngman Rhee clique and turned South Korea into an armed camp aimed at China and our Soviet friends.

In the southwest, the Government of India has now gone further. Prime Minister Nehru writes to us of peace, trust and “just” settlements. In the same days his government declares a “defensive pact” with the Tibetan local authorities and the feudal rulers of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, petitions the Security Council against China, and sends an armored division, an airborne division and three infantry divisions onto Chinese soil. This is not defense. A government that signs a pact with a region of another nation, and then marches its armies into it, is carrying out an invasion.

The Indian note speaks of Tibet’s “right” to peaceful reintegration with China. Tibet is an inseparable part of China. It is not a foreign state, and no outside power may grant or withhold its “right” to be part of our country. The note also raises the McMahon Line, a border drawn in 1914 by British imperialists with no Chinese government’s consent. India now asks us to negotiate its legacy while Indian divisions stand on our soil. We do not accept negotiation at the point of a bayonet.

Nor will we accept lectures on “self-determination” from the heirs of an empire that ruled four hundred million Asians without asking them. Self-determination was not the policy of the British Raj, and it is not the policy of those who now speak for the Raj’s successors in the councils of the West.

Chairman Mao has taught us how to regard those who threaten a people’s revolution: “All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful.”Fleets, puppets and borrowed pacts do not make an enemy strong, and the people of China are not afraid.

The Central People’s Government therefore declares to the world:

1. The People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of all China, including Taiwan and Tibet.
2. Indian armed forces in Tibet are foreign forces on Chinese territory. The Chinese people demand their immediate and complete withdrawal.
3. The so-called “defensive pact” and any other arming, funding, recognition, guarantee or deployment in support of separatist forces on Chinese territory is an act of aggressive hostility against the Chinese people, and will be answered as such.
4. The Security Council has no standing to speak for China while a Kuomintang remnant, expelled by the Chinese people, still wrongfully occupies China’s seat. We note that the Soviet Union, our friend, has refused to sit with it.

Responsibility for all consequences rests entirely with those who chose to cross China’s borders.

China wants peace. We have no designs on Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan or the territory of India, and we have said so. If the Government of India withdraws its forces from Tibet and renounces its interference there, we are prepared to discuss the border and the ordinary relations of neighbors on the basis of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference. But a people who defeated Japan and overthrew Chiang Kai-shek will not be threatened into silence on their own soil.

We call on the peace loving peoples of Asia and the world, on the socialist camp and on every newly independent nation, to see this encirclement for what it is and to stand with us against it.

Long live the People’s Republic of China!
Long live the unity of the peoples of the world against imperialism!

This is dedicated to the Brave Kazukite Branch of the CWP-NLF

Belgrade, Yugoslavia

March 1950

Yugoslavia’s Worker’s Councils will represent employees within Party-set political and economic priorities of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), in which all enterprises - private or state-owned will have worker’s councils in which the councils are to have the ability to make workplace decisions. These worker’s councils, which will be manned by employees of the enterprise (vetted by local party offices), seek to establish rules in the best interest of employees including decision making power as it relates to wages, allocated time off, and career mobility. Promotions in general will be decided by a committee of enterprise managers and council representatives.

While Worker’s Councils will remain limited in how they can impact an enterprise (with enterprise managers to retain ultimate decision making power on how to distribute and manage profits), Worker’s Councils will carry the burden of communicating party priorities, organizing employees, and will be granted binding input over personnel, compliance, and major company decisions - while leaving routine business operations to management.

Formation of Worker’s Councils

All enterprises in Yugoslavia will have until December 1950 to form worker’s councils and charter an official schedule for Councils to meet regularly. At these council meetings, the workers may establish committees to consider wages, working conditions, leave, training, promotion, and address employee grievances.

Day-to-Day Operations

Ultimately, enterprise managers will retain final authority over daily administration, production methods, and commercial dealings - while consulting with and maintaining transparency with their respective Council. Should disagreements arise, the Worker’s Council of each enterprise will be empowered to call upon local CPY officials to resolve the dispute via a consultative working session. Should an agreement not be reached, these matters may be escalated to relevant local party committees or the appropriate government authorities for reviews. Ultimately, the decisions of the enterprise must match national law, party policy, and the state economic plan.

[February 1950]

Orders have been sent down from New Delhi to suspend attempts to cross the Himalayas into Tibet, and to suspend all sorties of supplies and equipment by air to Lhasa. All personnel present in Tibet are to be evacuated back to India by airlift; with any supplies too onerous to remove being de-prioritized, to be recovered later if possible. Inclement weather and snowfall limited the effectiveness of efforts to functionally execute the operation in the first place; with most troops never leaving their starting positions.

The strategic pivot is all but certain to be a diplomatic black eye for the Indian Republic, and Nehru's government in particular for the foreseeable future.

Paris, 14–24 February 1950

Proportional representation, introduced after the Liberation, had produced an Assembly divided among several substantial political forces, but the experience of October's constitutional crisis had strengthened demands for a system capable of producing more coherent parliamentary majorities. The Radicals were particularly insistent upon a return to the traditional scrutin d'arrondissement, under which deputies would be elected in individual constituencies through two rounds of voting. Édouard Daladier and his supporters regarded the existing system as an obstacle to the recovery of Radical influence, while Édouard Herriot and the party's ministers feared that an uncompromising campaign for electoral reform might provoke another governmental crisis. The divisions extended well beyond the Radical Party. Christian Democratic representatives were increasingly determined to preserve proportional representation, while sections of the SFIO, particularly in the Nord, favoured a return to majority voting against the objections of other Socialist federations. Jacques Fauvet reported in Le Monde on 14 February that electoral reform had become a major preoccupation among the parties, but the discussions in Paris were already revealing something more serious than ordinary disagreement over electoral methods. The parliamentary groups could scarcely establish a common definition of what the reform was supposed to accomplish, and proposals welcomed by one section of the majority were being treated by another as threats to its continued representation.

Several competing schemes circulated through parliamentary discussions. The traditional scrutin d'arrondissement would restore individual constituencies and a second ballot, permitting candidates to negotiate local withdrawals and endorsements after the first round. A proposal previously associated with René Coty contemplated departmental lists elected through two rounds, introducing a majority principle while retaining proportional representation where the required majority could not be obtained. Christian Democratic deputies Roques and Taillade defended another arrangement through apparentements de listes, allowing parties to present separate lists while combining their electoral strength through declared alliances. Under their proposed mechanism, an alliance reaching a prescribed majority threshold could obtain the seats available in its constituency, while proportional distribution would apply when that threshold was not achieved. Yet the disagreements concerned more than technical arrangements. Radical representatives rejected formulas which, in their view, preserved the authority of party organizations at the expense of local candidates. The MRP feared that majority voting would leave its deputies dependent upon agreements with larger parties, particularly in departments where Christian Democratic support was substantial but insufficient to secure an outright victory. Within the SFIO, Guy Mollet confronted the preferences of northern Socialist organizations alongside the objections of deputies fearing contests against stronger Communist candidates. Jules Moch, meanwhile, opposed the restoration of single-member voting, favouring arrangements which permitted parties to present their programmes independently before entering electoral cooperation at a subsequent stage. The Socialist parliamentary group remained unable to adopt a common position, while the Radicals increasingly refused to consider compromises which preserved the existing proportional system.

Pleven himself was not hostile to the majority principle. His UDSR shared much of the Radical preference for two-round voting, and the prime minister understood the arguments advanced in favour of restoring a closer relationship between deputies and their constituencies. The difficulty lay in the attempt to impose that preference upon a government whose Christian Democratic and Socialist ministers could not agree upon its consequences. Even within the Rassemblement des gauches républicaines, the association between the Radicals and the UDSR was becoming strained by the insistence of Daladier's supporters that electoral reform receive immediate governmental attention. Pleven was willing to examine the restoration of constituency voting, but refused to make its adoption a condition of continued ministerial cooperation before the parties had agreed upon a workable proposal. Queuille warned that this distinction was becoming increasingly difficult to defend before Radical representatives, whose provincial federations expected their ministers to secure more than another promise of consultation. The MRP leadership maintained its objections to two-round voting, while Mollet declined to commit the SFIO to a formula which its own parliamentary group had not accepted. Discussions that had initially concerned the merits of competing electoral systems began to acquire the character of a dispute over whether the government possessed the authority to settle the question at all.

The confrontation came openly before the Radical executive committee on 22 February, at the Salle des Horticulteurs in Paris. Under the presidency of Émile Roche, Senator Laffargue of the Seine defended a resolution demanding electoral reform without fixing a precise deadline, an approach which encountered immediate resistance from delegates impatient with the caution of the party's ministers. Paul Anxionnaz, deputy for the Marne, demanded the definitive adoption of a majority electoral law within three months and the withdrawal of Radical ministers should the government fail to comply. Representatives of the Gironde federation pressed for the introduction of legislation within fifteen days, followed by its adoption within three months. Herriot appealed for restraint, warning against the consequences of provoking another ministerial crisis, but his intervention did little to reconcile the competing resolutions. The more militant delegates accused the parliamentary leadership of subordinating the party's electoral interests to the preservation of ministerial offices, while Queuille's supporters defended the necessity of obtaining legislation through negotiation rather than ultimatum. Daladier eventually intervened with a compromise requiring the government to introduce an electoral reform bill and secure its discussion before the end of the current parliamentary session. The motion was adopted, although the disagreement over whether the eventual legislation must restore the majority principle remained unresolved. The executive stopped short of ordering the immediate withdrawal of Radical ministers, but the proceedings demonstrated how little patience remained among delegates who regarded the existing electoral system as intolerable.

The adopted resolution also demanded firmer governmental action against disturbances threatening public order in metropolitan France and the French Union, expressly including Indochina. This further complicated the position of the Radical ministers, whose continued participation in Pleven's administration was being questioned by colleagues dissatisfied with both electoral policy and the conduct of internal security. Queuille conveyed the executive's demands to Matignon, where the ensuing discussions exposed the full extent of disagreement within the cabinet. Schuman and the Christian Democratic ministers resisted any commitment to majority voting, while Mollet refused to guarantee Socialist support for a system whose consequences remained disputed within the SFIO. Pleven defended the legitimacy of examining two-round voting and reminded his colleagues that the UDSR had never renounced its preference for that principle, but insisted that the government could not introduce a bill which important sections of its own parliamentary majority were already determined to oppose. Radical representatives considered further examination insufficient unless accompanied by a definite legislative timetable. The prime minister declined to make the question one of confidence, but the ministers could not agree upon an electoral formula which they were collectively prepared to defend before the Assembly.

Pleven instructed Moch's Ministry of the Interior to undertake a formal comparison of the principal systems, including constituency boundaries, the administration of a second ballot, the allocation of seats and the operation of electoral alliances. The parliamentary groups were invited to communicate their preferred arrangements, while the government reserved its decision upon the contents of any subsequent legislation. The instructions did not satisfy Daladier's supporters, who continued demanding a firm commitment to majority voting, nor did they reassure the MRP, whose leaders feared that the technical examination might become the preliminary stage of a reform they opposed. The SFIO's representatives remained divided between different majority and proportional formulas, and the UDSR's own attachment to two-round voting made Pleven's refusal to commit the cabinet increasingly uncomfortable to explain. Before the end of February, the Interior Ministry began receiving incompatible proposals from deputies who had recently cooperated over the budget and collective bargaining. Queuille demanded a date upon which the government would introduce its promised bill, while Schuman insisted that no text should be submitted without agreement among the governing parties. Pleven instructed Moch to proceed with the examination, but the disagreement had already escaped the confines of administrative preparation. The Radicals were demanding legislation, the Christian Democrats were refusing the principal reform demanded by the Radicals, and the prime minister was left to seek a proposal which neither side had yet shown itself willing to accept.

It all started normally enough. RMS Rangitki passed Rangitoto Island as planned just after first light and rounded North Head half an hour later. Meeting up with one of Auckland’s resident tugs and a harbour pilot, within the hour, she was being brought alongside Captain Cook Wharf where lines were thrown and gangways attached. On the upper decks, as customs officers boarded and did their duty, her crew and passengers alike enjoyed the cool Auckland Autumn which was in stark contrast to the tropical oppression of Malaya.

Soon enough, customs cleared the ship and she began to disgorge her cargo of men, mail, and souvenirs. It was Rangitiki’s third voyage to support Malaya Force and by now her crew had grown accustom to the routine. Within days, she would be emptied of her military cargo, the makeshift machine gun mounts removed, and she would be ready to resume commercial service ahead of another Malaya charter scheduled for mid-year.

Expect that wouldn’t happen this time. As Rangitiki’s crew unloaded cargo, they noticed that instead of it being moved from the wharf, it was being left there. When they called for a crane to offload a damaged Army jeep, noone answered and none arrived. The bus, scheduled to take the soldiers back to Linton, likewise never showed.

At first annoyed and then intrigued by the delay, the senior military officer onboard eventually sent a junior officer to the gates of the dock, where men could be seen mulling about, to determine the cause of the delay. When the Sub lieutenant returned to the ship, he had bad news for his boss.

“Sir, they say that they are boycotting. They say that they won’t unload a ship that’s part of our, um, imperialist war in Asia and that they won’t allow military vehicles onto their wharf.”

“Shit,” was the reply.

When the news reached Wellington, Prime Minister Sidney Holland damn-near took the head off of the military man tasked with informing him.

“They never fucking boycotted when [Peter] Fraser was in charge! We haven’t fucking done anything,” he yelled.

The truth of that statement not withstanding, the men of the Waterside Workers’ Union’s (WWU) Auckland section were refusing to work on ships supporting Malaya Force.

Holland’s first action was to call a cabinet meeting, his second was to order Rangitiki to sail across the harbor to Devonport Naval Base, and his third was to call the Chief Censor. The Chief Censor promptly issued a blanket order banning media from reporting on the strike or publishing material supportive of the WWU.

The move of Rangitiki across the harbor could not go unnoticed - the people of Auckland are not blind - so the government quickly spun it. Speaking to a conservative outlet, aligned with the National Party, Minister of Defence Tom MacDonald explained that Rangitiki had been sent to Devonport to provide experience for a new class of conscripted Navy stevedores.

“New Zealand’s compulsory military trainees need experience unloading ships quickly and efficiently,” he said.

“It was suggested to me that the return of Rangitiki was a great opportunity for them to put their skills to work. Unfortunately, word didn’t reach Rangitiki until she had already come alongside, which is why she moved this afternoon.”

“I’m told it’s not unusual for ships to move between Devonport and the Port of Auckland, so truth be told I’m a tad baffled by the interest!” he said.

At the snap cabinet meeting, held the next day, the Ministers of Defence, Labour and Justice presented their plan to address the strike. In an unusual move, the leader of the opposition and former Prime Minister, Peter Fraser was included in the first section of the meeting owing to his considerable influence with the unions.

The plan was simple:

• Police negotiators, the Minister of Labour and Peter Fraser would meet with the WWU to try and come to a compromise by offering a 10% pay increase as the carrot and deregistration as the stick.
• If no agreement could be reached then the government would declare a National Emergency on the basis of Malaya Force being engaged in warfare, dismantle and deregister the WWU while allowing non-militant sections to remain registered, and use National Emergency provisions to ban anyone from providing funds, food, support or material to striking workers or their families. It would also be made illegal to employee the wives or children of WWU members
• The government would introduce amendments to both the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 and Civil Aviation Act 1948 banning the establishment of multi-airport unions on the public basis of their being different safety issues at different airports. This, according to the Minister of Defence, would mean that a similar situation could never happen at New Zealand’s airports.
• The Royal New Zealand Air Force would order long-range strategic transport aircraft to reduce the Army’s dependence on shipping for mail and irregular personnel movement.
• The government would support a 14% wage increase for workers in maritime unions formally associated with the Federation of Labour (FOL).

Come 14 March 1950, the strike was still dragging on, though they remained confined to Auckland and negotiations were ongoing. It remained to be seen what the results of them would be.

January 1950

Liu Bocheng has pushed for a formal academy since 1946, and since the liberation of northern China many other officers and generals of the People’s Liberation Army have joined him. A great deal of discussion has gone into how such an academy should be organized. Some want a free flowing academy that trains all officers the same way. Others want a fully established rank system with classes for each level and higher education for officers. Some want small selective schools like the Guangdong Military and Political University, established last year for special forces and command training only. After a long and sometimes bitter debate, the Central Military Commission has settled on a compromise. Three academies shall open.

中华民国广州军事学院

Guangzhou Military Academy of the Republic of China

Today, to mark the first year of a New United China, the old Republic of China Military Academy on Changzhou Island is to be refurbished and reopened. The project is championed by its former Head of the Political Department Zhou Enlai and his comrade Nie Rongzhen, another political instructor there. Comrade Ye Jianying, another former instructor at Whampoa, is to be made Principal of the school. The disused campus will be heavily expanded to cover 1,500 hectares of the ruined city around it, alongside a separate rural enclave of 2,100 hectares for tank and artillery training. Sun Yat-sen’s portrait will hang in the main hall again. The old gate couplet will be restored, declaring that those who seek promotion and wealth should go elsewhere and those who fear death should not enter, beneath the old motto 亲爱精诚, “affection and sincerity”. The Party’s message is that the revolution inherited Dr. Sun’s school, and that the Whampoa of 1924 was always meant to belong to the people’s army.

The academy is the principal commissioning school for the combined arms. From Whampoa it takes its purpose, that politics and soldiering are one subject and not two. Every class carries political education, every cadet company has a Party branch and a commissar, and no cadet will graduate who cannot explain to a peasant why the army fights. From West Point it borrows its discipline and structure: a Corps of Cadets organized into battalions and companies, a fixed four term yearly calendar, a heavy core of mathematics, surveying and engineering, and daily recitation in small sections where each cadet must stand and defend a solution before the instructor speaks. The Chinese name for this method is the Zhuge Liang meeting, and cadets will be taught to treat it as a rehearsal for the councils they will hold before every battle.

No cadet may enter directly from civilian life. A candidate must hold the Xiàshì grade, have served at least one year in a line unit, and be endorsed by his Party committee and by a vote of his comrades. The course lasts three years. The first year covers politics, drill, infantry weapons, mathematics and Russian. The second year covers the combined arms: artillery, engineers, signals, armor, logistics and medical service. The third year is command practice, where each cadet rotates through company and battalion command in field problems across the Pearl River delta, the hills of Guangdong and the coastal islands. Every summer cadets leave the campus and live in the ranks with a working unit, eating the same rations and digging the same trenches as the soldiers they will one day lead. Graduates are awarded the Shàngshì grade.

Discipline rests on the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, which serve as the academy’s honor code. Cadet committees may bring a comrade before a cadet tribunal, and lying, cheating or stealing from the people means expulsion without appeal, as it did in the old academy. Hazing is forbidden as a feudal habit of the old army. Senior cadets act as older brothers to the junior classes, answerable for their training and conduct. The teaching staff is drawn from the best field commanders of the war on two year tours, supported by engineers and surveyors who have come over from the old regime and been cleared by the Central Social Department, and by Soviet advisers for armor, artillery and staff work.

For the first class intact of 1950, 1,470 men will fill the first graduating class and among them around a third of 490, the same number as the original first graduating class of 1924, will continue on to the Academy Command Course. Most of these first attendees are previous cadres from the Civil War who command guerrilla or other forces small units under the PLA with only a quarter being fresh taken from enlisted men.

中华民国西安突击编队学院

Xi’an Assault Formation Academy

The Republic of China Xi’an Assault Formation Academy is the smallest of the three academies, but is still given 1,200 hectares of land north of Xi’an as an allotment. Here the Academy will train mechanized, tank and the soon to be public ‘Lóngqíbīng’ formations in urban, guerrilla and new forms of warfare. Its working principle is that speed is itself a weapon, and that a fast force that outruns its own fire support is a force that has already lost.

The answer is that the guns go with the spear. Every assault formation trained at Xi’an is built as a small combined arms group in which infantry, tanks, assault guns and artillery train and fight together from the first day. The core of its fire support is self propelled guns using the heavy ISU-152 for close infantry support and for breaking fortified positions, bunkers and city strongpoints, where they follow the assault infantry at fifty to one hundred meters. Behind them travel the lighter towed weapons that the army can move by truck and Jeep: 76mm divisional guns, 120mm heavy mortars, captured American pack howitzers and Katyusha rocket launchers on truck chassis. Cadets learn to displace by bounds, with one battery firing while the next moves, so the fire never stops following the advance.

Each formation also carries its own forward observers, who ride in the lead vehicles and send fire requests directly, without waiting for approval from above. This is where the academy’s doctrine of mission command is tested hardest. A battery commander is taught the intent of the assault, not a timetable, and is expected to choose his own positions and targets. The training grounds reflect this. Cadets train in the loess hills and the Qinling foothills, on a mock city built from the rubble of damaged districts, and in night marches over open plain, with live fire exercises designed so that a commander must regroup and continue after radio contact is lost. Maintenance, fuel discipline and recovery are examined as strictly as tactics,since the review of last year’s losses at the Yangtze crossing found that more tanks were lost to inexperience and poor upkeep than to the enemy.

中华民国中央军事委员会总训练学院

The General Training Academy of the Central Military Commission

The General Training Academy of the Central Military Commission is the highest level academy, established to train senior leadership and general staff for the People’s Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA and CPC. It is also to strengthen the strategic management of military training, joint force training and the ‘guidance’ of service and service level training, so that the army trains to one standard from the Xiàshì to the commander of an army. Its functions are divided among a Doctrine and Regulations Bureau, which writes the drill regulations and training manuals for every arm; an Inspection and Assessment Bureau, which tests units and certifies leadership grades; a Schools and Education Bureau, which oversees every academy and course in the army; a Joint Training Bureau, which plans exercises that bring the ground, air and naval services together; and a Political Training Bureau, where the highest grades and the training of commissars will be undertaken. The land grant will be 190 hectares in Beijing, close to the headquarters of the Central Military Commission, with a staff set up to be determined. Liu Bocheng is placed in charge of its organization, with Xiao Ke as head of the General Training Academy.

The Grades of Leadership

An important distinction of the academies is their application of a ‘leadership grade’ to those who pass their rigorous standards. A grade is not a rank. It confers only the responsibility the candidate may be trusted to command, and the candidate must have completed the previous course before receiving the next. Time in each grade is mandatory, a move designed to slow the progression of ambitious officers. A man who is relieved of his post loses the authority of his grade, and every promotion is confirmed by the Party committee. The lowest grade is the Xiàshì, signifying to commanders the individual’s ability to command a fireteam and, when required, a single squad, with the highest, the Zǒngshì, able to command a corps or army.

The Bānzhǎng Courses

The foundation of the whole system is the Bānzhǎng Courses, run by every army and military region under the guidance of the General Training Academy. They are short, practical and open to any soldier recommended by his unit. A man who completes the first stage earns the Xiàshì grade and a place in the line as a trained fireteam leader. The advanced stage, taken after a year of service, earns the Zhōngshì grade. The courses teach marksmanship, fieldcraft, first aid, map reading and the basics of fire and movement, together with political study. Their central lesson is that every soldier must understand the aim of the mission so well that he can carry it out when his officer is dead. Commanders will find that a Xiàshì of the new army understands the plan and not just his orders.

The Dragoon Training Force

Attached to the Xi’an academy as both demonstration unit and test bed is the Dragoon Training Force, the first formation of the Lóngqíbīng. It combines the Inner Mongolian cavalry cadres of Ulanhu, trained as scouts and flank guards, with motor infantry in captured American trucks and Jeeps, a company of light tanks and armored cars, an assault gun battery and a battery of pack howitzers. Its mission is deep exploitation: break through, race past the enemy front and cut off his retreating armies before they can reform. Because fuel, spare parts and trained mechanics are scarce, it will remain small, a single experimental regiment, until the concept has been proven and the army can afford to build more.

A Report on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force

Under the command of Liu Yalou, the new air force is being rebuilt from the dozens of gifted Yak-9s. Its old training schools from 1947 are being redesigned up in the northeast, under Soviet advisers, using a mix captured Japanese and Nationalist aircraft along with Soviet provided planes with a small number of former Imperial Japanese Army instructors who have offered their services acting as 'rehabilitated' mentors to our young force. The first priority is trained pilots and ground crews, not aircraft, and the General Training Academy will set the standards for both. A handful of experienced airmen are already being sent to the Soviet Union for advanced instruction. It will be several years before the air force can support the ground armies in anything more than a limited way.

A Worry

This academy is creating an internal level of disagreement between the Professionalists and the Militia supporters of the CPC, and is pushing Kao Kang further into Mao’s circle. While a formal academy is needed for the People’s Liberation Army, the use of a hierarchical system, even if not formal ‘ranks’, is one that displeases the Chinese Chairman. Mao’s allies say that an army of grades and classrooms will forget the people’s war that won the revolution. The Professionalists reply that the Yangtze losses prove no army can win the next war on enthusiasm alone. The Chairman has not yet spoken, and until he does, every officer sending a recommendation or signing a course roster is aware that he may be asked to account for it...

The ailing health of C.G.E. Mannerheim forced the old Marshal to step down from the presidency just two years into his term in 1946. Instead of calling a new election, the Government ruled that the Finnish Parliament would vote for a President for the remaining term. Experienced and respected Juho Kusti Paasikivi from the conservative National Coalition Party was elected with strong support, as even the communist People’s Democrats supported him in 1946.

The presidency of Paasikivi was relatively popular, and during his term, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were stabilized and Finland affirmed its non-alignment. The main criticism was directed at his age. Paasikivi was 80 years old and would be 86 years old at the end of his term. Publicly, he did not express unreserved interest in a new term either, so it was not a huge surprise when Paasikivi announced that he wouldn’t seek reelection. Thus, the 1950 Presidential election was set to be more contentious than the previous one. The election was conducted as an indirect election, and the parties represented in Parliament were able to name candidates.

The most interesting and important question before the elections was who would “succeed” Paasikivi. The National Coalition Party was only the fourth-largest party in Parliament but, in the minds of the people, the Party enjoyed a status as a wise foreign policy actor with many prestigious politicians. When it became clear that somebody would have to replace Paasikivi, there were many possible candidates, but the choice had to be someone who represented wisdom, statecraft and continuity, but also a willingness to clearly defend Finnish independence and sovereignty. Finally, the National Coalition Party came to an interesting, even somewhat divisive but at least refreshing conclusion: their new man would be former Prime Minister Edwin Linkomies. He was called back from political retirement and his position as a professor at the University of Helsinki. Other smaller center-right parties, most notably the Swedish People’s Party, publicly endorsed Linkomies and did not nominate their own candidates.

The communist Finnish People’s Democratic League was the main contender against Linkomies and the right-wing parties. Before the elections, the Party toyed with the idea of nominating Hertta Kuusinen. She would have been the first woman to be a candidate in a Finnish presidential election. Kuusinen was also a very charismatic and fiery public speaker who did not shy away from sensitive topics and, as a woman, she could have gathered votes across the political field. However, her womanhood was also her downfall, as the communist leadership feared that the reactionary elements in Finnish society were still too strong to overcome. Instead, the People’s Democrats nominated Mauno Pekkala, a former Prime Minister who also had strong relations with Moscow.

The centrist Agrarian League presented an interesting case. A young and charismatic rising star of the League called Urho Kekkonen had received some attention in the party and even in the national press during spring and summer. Kekkonen was starting to gather a number of supporters for a potential presidential bid. However, as is often the case with big personalities, by autumn Kekkonen had also received his fair share of enemies inside the Party. A vocal group in the Agrarian League refused to endorse Kekkonen, as he was deemed too divisive, and some critics warned about his potentially authoritarian tendencies. In the end, this forced the Agrarian League to name a somewhat weak consensus candidate, V. J. Sukselainen, for the elections.

The Social Democrats were notably missing from the ballot. The SDP announced that it would not nominate a candidate but would still participate in the elections. Publicly, the Party refrained from endorsing any candidate, but it was a well-known fact that the Social Democrats had supported Paasikivi’s foreign policy and were more likely to support his successor than the Agrarian League or the People’s Democrats. The recent infighting in the party had also contributed to the decision.

The first results were relatively close, and a second round would have been necessary. However, as the Social Democrats decided to vote for the candidate of the National Coalition Party, the electoral college elected Edwin Linkomies as the 8th President of the Republic of Finland.

As one of his first tasks, President Linkomies addressed the Finnish population and stated the need for further national unity. He called on Finns to put aside the divisions of the past and work together to build a strong, independent and democratic Finland. Political disagreements had to be settled through democratic institutions, and the actions of the past should not define whom Finland trusts or what kind of country it seeks to be. He himself was a living proof of the fact that Finland had moved on from the haunting memories of the past.

Linkomies then addressed Finland’s neighbour to the East. According to Linkomies, the Soviet Union would remain an important and equal partner for Finland, as outlined by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1947. Finland would remain a friendly, non-aligned nation towards the Soviet Union and would continue to recognize the special security position of the Soviet Union. Linkomies emphasized that Finland aspired to maintain peaceful and economically beneficial relations with her neighbour. Finland would also respect all of its obligations to the Soviet Union. At the same time, he argued that Finland was and would remain an independent and sovereign Nordic democracy that had deep historical and societal ties to Northern and Western Europe, with freedom as one of its defining national values. Thus, Finland’s domestic and foreign policies could only be forged in Helsinki.

December, 1949

With the war over, and another beginning the need for our Tank Corps to have units assigned to each army is at an end.

All armored formations, save light tanks and armored cars assigned to policing duties, are to be moved to Northern China to begin heavy exercises on tactics, maintenance, use, and survivability of all assets.

The recent lose of a few dozen tanks crossing the Yangtze was caused by lack of training and a heavy review has been desired since.

Notably

• The 1st Tank is to be stationed in South-Eastern Manchuria where it will conduct training under Soviet Advisors
• The 2nd Tank will be moved to Inner Mongolia
• 3rd Tank will be moved to Chongqing
• All Heavy Tank units expect the 2nd will be moved to Manchuria

December, 1949

HEADQUARTERS, PLA ARMORED CORPS
ORDER ON THE CONSOLIDATION AND TRAINING OF ARMORED FORMATIONS

1. SITUATION

The war on the mainland is concluded. With it, the requirement to attach armored formations to individual Field Armies has ended.

A review of the recent crossing of the Yangtze, in which several dozen tanks were lost, has established that the losses resulted from insufficient crew training. The Armored Corps considers this unacceptable, and corrective measures are ordered below.

2. ORDERS

a. Effective immediately, all armored formations are withdrawn from Field Army command and returned to the control of the Armored Corps. Light tank and armored car units assigned to policing duties are excepted.

b. Formations will move to the stations below and begin intensive exercises in tactics, maintenance, operation and survivability of all vehicles and equipment.

c. Commanders will submit a written report on the state of training, maintenance and crew readiness within ninety days of arrival.

3. TRAINING OF KOREAN PERSONNEL

All remaining Korean personnel serving in the People’s Liberation Army will receive instruction in tank combat before their return to Korea. This training will be conducted by the 78th Armored Training Division.

As a gift to the Korean comrades, twelve (12) IS-2 heavy tanks will accompany them on their return, drawn from Corps reserve stocks.

4. EXECUTION

Orders take effect on receipt. Movements are to be completed without interrupting the security of the liberated territories.

Xu Guangda
Commander, PLA Armored Corps

January 6th, 1950

Czechoslovakia is an industrial powerhouse, capable of churning out a truly gargantuan amount, far more than the military can reasonably use. The Worker's Militia, the armed body of the Czech people, was small, and most units, especially outside major cities, were poorly organized and led, even though the country had more than enough firearms to arm and equip them. Most Czechoslovakians also lacked firsthand experience with firearms, despite permissive rules regarding their ownership, by far the loosest laws in the Eastern Bloc. Czechoslovakia also suffers from many highly damaging invasive species, brought into the country by capitalists and aristocrats in ages gone past. Unfortunately, the invasive species did not go with them, and now Czechoslovakia's good working men and women must handle them. General Reicin intends to launch a coordinated sweep of the entire country to finish destroying the invasive species, but for now he must learn to walk by crushing knotweed beneath his boot.

Brigadier General Reicin, however, had learned a thing or two in China. Czechoslovaks are beset by invasive species, primarily invasive plants. Knotweed is one of the most vile of these enemies of Czechoslovakia, and it has remained extremely difficult to kill. Brigadier General Reicin had a plan for that, though. Now, Knotweed can grow roots up to ten feet deep, but a ČKD excavator can easily reach deeper. Now, to complete the annihilation of this invasive species, militia troopers armed with flamethrowers (the Soviet ROKS-3) will use them to incinerate the dirt, killing any seeds or remnants of the knotweed. Flamethrowers currently have no place in Czechoslovak doctrine, but a significant stockpile exists, and Svoboda was convinced by Reicin to allow the militia to utilize them for the betterment of the nation.

Reicin has dubbed this initiative "Operation Brushfire". The Militia will learn coordination from this task. While the knotweed can't fire back, using flamethrowers and excavators on riverbanks is still dangerous, and it will force the people carrying it out to learn to work together and communicate clearly. The total eradication of knotweed has been called "impossible" by some within the party, mostly those with botany experience, but Reicin knows well the power of communist zeal. Sure, it may be difficult, but Reicin can mobilize an army of Czechoslovak citizens to work their way through the entire country. It will take years, but they will achieve it. To do so with maximum effectiveness, the militia will work from the headwaters of Czechoslovak rivers to where they leave the country, or to lakes. This way, any knotweed growth caused by disturbances upriver will be dealt with, and the flow of the water will prevent recolonization

The Election results are in:

National Front (Mossadegh): 11
Independents: 125

The lack of any majority or political parties apart from Mossadegh’s National Front meant that any prospective prime minister would need to first scrounge together an ad-hoc coalition and then keep that coalition. As expected no man was able to reliable do so.

The first Prime Minister was the outgoing Mohammad Sa’ed who could not gain a majority of votes and was thus ousted. 

From April to June Ali Mansur would act as a caretaker, the only person everyone could agree was the least worst option until the next best came along.

From June onwards Ali Razmara would have the reigns, an apparent reformer of sorts. He would propose vast democratic reforms (did not pass the parliament) and went about sacking large amounts of government officials to save government money and to stop corruption. While this direct measure was actually successful it would anger everyone in the political class and gain him little supporters.

While for the enemies of Iran this sequence of events (and the ones to follow) would be amusing for those in Iran this situation was untenable. The Shah wanted someone who could actually control parliament, preferably he wanted a government that would work with him and not try to strip his powers. Slowly the Shah began to get other ideas about government, one where he did not have to be beholden to rambunctious parliamentarians who constantly clamored for his downfall. For Mossadegh he would spend his time working through the independents, steadily gaining support until he could command a majority and become Prime Minister.

The Tudeh Party was hard at work, their aid had delivered results for Mossadegh and hopefully his ascension would be their gain. They would work to keep the workers, youth and poor whipped up with support for them. Promises of land reform, democracy, national sovereignty are incredibly popular and the Tudeh party has reaped dividends.

March 4th, 1950

While Portugal has committed itself to being a champion of the Free World against those that would undermine it, it can not easily do it without first developing itself. The economic history of Portugal has been one of stagnation and lagging behind its contemporary peers. The instability of the late Monarchy and the early Republic before Salazar’s rule crippled the country’s finances, leaving it in a sorry state by the time Salazar took control in 1933. While the Estado Novo regime has stabilized the country’s finances and brought modest economic growth, that alone has not allowed Portugal to catch up to countries such as Spain or Italy. If Portugal is to make its mark in this day and age, it needs to go beyond good stewardship and proactively work to undo decades of neglect by previous governments.

While most, if not a substantial part, of the Portuguese economy relies on the agricultural sector, with particular emphasis on the export of luxury goods such as wine and cork, reforming this vital sector can not be done with the resources Portugal has to bear. The rural lobby, represented by the forty-families, have long resisted meaningful reform to agriculture and Salazar neither has the money to ignore them or the political desire to antagonize them without reason. The modernization of agriculture in Portugal will need to wait once more.

However, not all is bleak for the Portuguese Republic for Portugal and her overseas territories are rich in mineral wealth while the domestic metal industry at home has seen sustained growth both during the war and after. Further investments into this industry, both to increase exports and production, would only benefit Portugal - especially with the fall of mainland China to the Communists and the continued unrest in both Bolivia and Burma - three of the world’s largest producers of minerals, including the valuable wolfram (tungsten).

While these investments are expected to boost the economic growth of Portugal to come, metal alone does not sustain an empire. To further synergize the development of the metal industry in particular (and industry writ large), additional investments must be made to ensure that the future does not barge in but comes in at a pace that satisfies both the agrarians and modernizers among the Portuguese elite.

Education Investment

In mainland Portugal, illiteracy is rampant among the population and is primarily concentrated among the rural peasantry. With a literacy rate below 50%, it is more likely that the average Portuguese citizen can’t read - let alone have a proper primary education - than not. To put it bluntly, by most education metrics Portugal is decades, if not a century, behind its European counterparts.

However, the abysmal literacy rates among the rural population has not gone unnoticed and the most recent stride forward made some successful. The Centenários plan, which has been in effect since December 1940, envisioned reducing/eliminating the urban-rural literacy and education gap through the construction of 9,314 classrooms across all of Portugal. Most of these classrooms would be built in rural areas where literacy rates were the lowest and funding for these classrooms would come from a mixture of the central government and local counties. However, as the plan enters its tenth year, only 1/9th of the planned classrooms have been constructed and there are only 150-200 classrooms currently under construction. While the fact that education took a backseat to other investments since 1940 is partially to blame, the Centenários has been mostly hampered by a lack of funding from rural counties, who could not afford to match the funds from Lisbon which left the classrooms unconstructed.

In order to implement the Centenários as envisioned last decade, the National Assembly has authorized $55 million into primary school construction over the next five years. This funding will be offered on top of the existing funding earmarked for construction under the Centenários plan as a way to mitigate the funding gap that exists without changing the plan as a whole or admitting defeat. Once the schools designated under the original Centenários plan are built, it is expected that mass literacy in Portugal will no longer be only limited to the urban centers and that the average education level will continue to increase over time. To ensure that these schools are properly staffed, an additional $3 million has been allocated to the 14 special tertiary schools already up and running since 1948 to handle the planned influx of teachers that will need to man these classrooms.

Overseas, illiteracy rates are even worse than in the mainland. Where the floor for literacy in mainland Portugal was 20-25%, this would represent the ceiling of literacy in several of Portugal’s oversea territories with real literacy rates resting at 5% or less in the worst provinces. While substantially worse than the situation in the metropolitan area, Portugal neither has the funding nor the desire to fund a mass literacy campaign in its African and Asian holdings. However, minor investments now will reduce the cost to do such a campaign later and allow further recruitment of the native population where unskilled workers are unsuitable for any reason.

As such, $12 million will be spent over the next five years to improve urban literacy in Cape Verde, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor with a particular investment in towns, cities, and ports vital to resource extraction.

Mineral Investments

While increasing literacy will boost the Portuguese economy in the long-run through increased productivity, Portugal will need to boost its economy in the short-term. An educated populace without suitable jobs is a populace willing to turn away from traditional values for material gains. In addition to the $70 million spent on education, the National Assembly has authorized an additional $41.5 million in spending to bolster the supply of raw minerals among the nations of the Free World while developing the Portuguese economy.

In mainland Portugal, emphasis will be placed on modernizing the wolfram (tungsten) and tin mines already under operation by further connecting operations to the national electrical grid and modernizing antiquated tools in use at these mines. Even if the expanded production at these mines do not yield an immediate increase in revenue, it is expected that the increase in wolfram and tin production will increase revenue in the future should conflict in Burma and Bolivia continue.

In Africa, Portuguese investments will be more diversified than in the mainland owing to the mineral richness of Portuguese holdings on the continent as well as the fact that several of these mines such as Cuima and Cassinga in Angola and Manica, Moatize, and Alto Ligonha in Mozambique either do not currently exist in any meaningful form or rely too heavily on local labor.

Angolan Investment

Mozambique Investment

In Asia, Portuguese investments will be primarily limited to the Portuguese exclave of Goa due to the lack of viable mineral deposits in other parts of Portuguese India, the lack of mineral exploration in East Timor and the fact that Macau is only a city. As such, a small amount than other parts of Portugal’s investment will go into bolstering the iron ore extraction from the Portuguese exclave by further connecting mineral operations to Goa’s harbor as well as reduce the upfront cost to start an iron concession in the province.

Asian Investment

While investing into new and old mines will yield higher exports, it is unclear if Portugal’s overseas ports has the capabilities needed to allow for the expedient export of the minerals once they are dug up. As such, part of $41.5 million earmarked for mineral development, approximately nine million dollars will be invested into expanding port and pier infrastructure at key points in Angola and Mozambique.

Port Investment

Electrical Production

Another area of the economy that needs work and where Portugal lags behind the rest of Europe is its electrical production. All of Western Europe produces more electricity per head than Portugal does and even Spain, who shares a similar per capita income, produces double that of Portugal. While several major cities - such as Porto - managed to switch most of its industrial users to its local grid, prices have remained stagnantly high for the past few decades, contributing to reduced demand for electricity across all economic sectors. While some have blamed Portugal’s low per capita income for the lackluster electrification of the country, the high price of electricity in Portugal can not be ignored as a cause.

Under the advice of Ferreira Dias, author of Junta de Electrificação Nacional, Prime Minister Salazar has authorized the construction of several dams across the country, aiming to reduce coal consumption and expand the use of hydroelectric power similar to Spain and Italy. Funding for these dams will not be up front but will be allotted as construction progresses over the next few years.

Portuguese Investment

Overseas, Portugal will follow the same policy as in the mainland by investing into hydroelectric dams in both Angola and Mozambique owing to the natural abundance of rivers. While electrical demand in Africa is primarily limited to major cities such Luanda and Beira, it is expected that the investments into mineral extraction will create additional demand for the electricity the dams provide in addition to any irrigation benefits the dams will provide as well..

Angolan Investment

Mozambique Investment

¹ The location of these schools are in Lisboa, Porto, Coimbra, Braga, Viseu, Évora, Faro, Guarda, Bragança, Vila Real, Funchal, Ponta Delgada, Horta, and Angra do Heroísmo.

As of 1949, the GDR has announced its recognition of the PDR Israel, a momentous occasion for all anti-fascist elements in the world. After the ceremony where it was announced, Otto Grotewohl, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, was asked to speak.

"Germany has committed the greatest crime in the world against the Jewish people. What once was almost a homeland, was, by the intervention of fascism and antisemitism, turned into a hell for them. However, now, the Jewish people have established a state of their own, and declared themselves as heroes of the Antifascist movement the world over! It was Israel which, in the 20th Century, won the first War of National Liberation against Anglo Imperialism in the Middle East! Fascism and imperialism flee before them! It is the stalwart goal of the German people to stand with them in the fight against fascism, and against the renewed winds of Antisemitism which, as of late, have begun to prevail in the center of world capitalism and imperialism, the USA."

Ottawa, 16–28 February 1950

February 16–20 — The Organization of Parliamentary Business

The opening of the Second Session of the Twenty-First Parliament brought before the House of Commons a considerable programme of legislative and financial business.

The Speech from the Throne, delivered by His Excellency Viscount Alexander of Tunis on 16 February, had announced the Government's intention to continue the implementation of the National Development Programme while introducing further measures concerning unemployment insurance, agricultural price supports, national defence, maritime affairs, veterans' benefits, and the administration of government.

Although the Address in Reply would occupy a substantial portion of the House's attention during the opening weeks, the Government considered that certain legislative matters required more immediate consideration.

The first sitting included the customary introduction of Bill No. 1, respecting the administration of oaths of office, in accordance with the established parliamentary practice of asserting the House's right to proceed with its own business.

The Government subsequently arranged its legislative programme so that urgent measures could be considered alongside the continuing debate upon the Address in Reply.

Particular importance was attached to unemployment insurance.

The winter months had brought increased unemployment in certain industries and regions, and the Government considered that existing provisions did not adequately protect all insured workers experiencing prolonged unemployment during the seasonal decline in employment.

The Minister of Labour, the Honourable Humphrey Mitchell, had consequently undertaken an examination of the existing arrangements under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940.

The Government determined that a measure providing supplementary winter benefits and extending insurance coverage should receive priority.

The remaining legislative programme would proceed as parliamentary time permitted, with agricultural measures requiring consideration before the expiration of certain existing statutory authorities.

February 21–24 — Amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act

February 21 — Introduction of the Financial Resolution

On 21 February, the Government placed before the House a resolution authorizing the introduction of legislation to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940.

The proposed measure was intended to provide additional protection for insured workers during periods of seasonal unemployment, extend insurance coverage to additional employees, and revise certain provisions governing contributions and administration.

The Government proposed the establishment of a system of winter supplementary benefits under which eligible workers who had exhausted their ordinary entitlement could receive additional assistance during the months when employment opportunities were most restricted.

The annual supplementary benefit period was to extend from 1 January to 31 March.

For the initial year, special transitional arrangements would permit payments from the commencement of the legislation until 15 April 1950.

The Government also proposed to increase the annual earnings ceiling governing compulsory insurance coverage from $3,120 to $4,800.

This adjustment was expected to bring approximately ninety thousand additional workers within the scope of the national insurance system.

Further changes were proposed concerning the treatment of employees in certain seasonal industries and occupations, including lumbering, logging, and stevedoring.

The legislation would also revise and simplify contribution arrangements and enlarge the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee from six members to eight.

The Government considered these changes necessary to maintain the usefulness of the insurance system under the economic conditions prevailing in Canada.

February 23 — The Government Explains the Measure

When the House resumed consideration of the proposed legislation on 23 February, the Government emphasized the urgency of providing assistance before the conclusion of the winter unemployment season.

The measure was presented as a modification of the existing insurance system rather than the establishment of an entirely new programme of public relief.

In explaining the Government's intentions, the Minister responsible for presenting the legislation observed:

"Mr. Speaker, the unemployment insurance system has now been in operation for a sufficient period to demonstrate its considerable value to Canadian workers.

"It has also revealed certain limitations which become particularly apparent during the winter months.

"There are workers who have contributed to the insurance fund and who, through no fault of their own, remain unemployed after their ordinary entitlement has been exhausted.

"The difficulties experienced by such persons are frequently greatest at precisely that time of year when the opportunities for obtaining alternative employment are most restricted.

"The Government believes that some additional provision should be made for these circumstances.

"We therefore propose supplementary benefits for qualified unemployed persons during the winter season.

"The assistance will be provided through the established unemployment insurance machinery and will be subject to the qualifying conditions prescribed by Parliament.

"We have also examined the earnings limits upon which insurance coverage depends.

"The existing ceiling no longer reflects adequately the wages received by many employees who were originally intended to come within the scheme.

"An increase in that ceiling will extend protection to additional workers and bring the operation of the legislation more closely into line with present economic conditions.

"The Government recognizes that unemployment insurance cannot itself create employment.

"It can, however, provide protection against the temporary loss of earnings and assist workers in maintaining themselves and their families while seeking further employment.

"We believe that the amendments now proposed will make the system more effective without departing from its fundamental principles."

The proposed supplementary benefits were to be calculated at eighty per cent of the ordinary benefit rate otherwise applicable to the insured worker.

Eligibility would remain subject to qualifying contributions and other statutory conditions.

The Government emphasized that the supplementary provisions were not intended to establish an unconditional payment to all unemployed persons.

Rather, the measure would extend the protection afforded by the existing contributory insurance system to workers satisfying the requirements of the amended legislation.

The Opposition Responds

George Drew, Leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition, acknowledged the desirability of assisting workers experiencing seasonal unemployment.

He nevertheless questioned the Government concerning the financial implications of the amendments and the adequacy of consultation with the organizations representing employers and employees.

Drew observed:

"Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that any honourable member would wish to prevent assistance from reaching those who are entitled to it merely because the necessary legislation has been presented at a late stage in the winter.

"But the urgency of the circumstances does not relieve the Government of its responsibility to explain the financial and administrative consequences of the measure.

"The unemployment insurance system depends upon contributions collected from employers and employees, together with the obligations which Parliament has undertaken on behalf of the public.

"Alterations to the contribution arrangements and the extension of benefits must therefore be considered in relation to the continued financial stability of the fund.

"We shall not oppose reasonable measures intended to provide necessary assistance.

"We do, however, expect the Government to furnish the information required for Parliament to understand the obligations being undertaken."

Members of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation welcomed the extension of benefits but expressed concern that the proposed arrangements would continue to exclude certain categories of workers.

The CCF argued that the Government should place greater emphasis upon maintaining employment and providing adequate income protection rather than relying solely upon temporary supplementary benefits.

Social Credit members likewise questioned whether unemployment insurance addressed the wider economic circumstances responsible for periods of declining employment.

Despite these differences, there was substantial agreement concerning the desirability of allowing qualified workers to receive the proposed winter assistance.

February 24 — Passage Through the House of Commons

On 24 February, the House proceeded with the consideration of Bill No. 8, An Act to Amend the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940.

The principal questions concerned the eligibility requirements for supplementary benefits, the proposed contribution arrangements, the extension of insurance coverage, and the financial responsibility of the Government.

During consideration of the measure, members examined the practical difficulties which had arisen under the existing insurance system.

Particular attention was given to workers in seasonal industries and to the circumstances in which an insured person might exhaust ordinary benefits before the winter unemployment period had concluded.

The Government maintained that the proposed supplementary provisions would afford additional protection while preserving the contributory character of the scheme.

Following consideration of the bill and its provisions, the House agreed to its third reading.

Bill No. 8 was accordingly passed by the House of Commons on 24 February 1950.

The legislation was transmitted to the Senate for its consideration.

The Government expressed its intention that the necessary parliamentary proceedings should be completed promptly so that supplementary payments could commence without unnecessary delay.

Royal Assent had not yet been granted at the conclusion of the February House proceedings.

February 24 — Presentation of the Main Estimates

In addition to the unemployment insurance legislation, the Government proceeded with its customary arrangements for parliamentary consideration of public expenditure.

The Main Estimates for the financial year commencing 1 April 1950 were placed before the House on 24 February.

These Estimates provided the framework within which Parliament would subsequently consider the appropriations necessary for the administration of government and the maintenance of public services during the coming fiscal year.

The Estimates included provision for ordinary departmental operations, statutory obligations, defence, social services, transportation, and the implementation of previously authorized government programmes.

The presentation of the Estimates did not constitute their final approval.

The House would be required to examine the proposed votes and provide the necessary parliamentary authority through the customary supply procedures.

The Minister of Finance, the Honourable Douglas Abbott, would subsequently present the Government's Budget and revenue proposals.

National Defence Expenditure

The Estimates were of particular importance in view of the Government's continuing programme of military modernization and its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Department of National Defence had prepared an expanded programme of expenditure intended to improve the readiness and efficiency of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force.

The Government's planning provision for national defence during the coming financial year amounted to approximately $597.9 million, including the cash requirements of the armed services, defence research, and other departmental obligations.

The programme contemplated improvements in equipment, training, maintenance, and operational preparedness.

The Government recognized that the expanded requirements of national defence would constitute a substantial charge upon the Treasury.

Nevertheless, it considered such expenditure necessary in view of Canada's international commitments and the importance of maintaining adequate means for the defence of the Dominion.

The detailed financial position of the Government, including the relationship between defence expenditure and other public commitments, would be addressed in the forthcoming Budget.

National Development Expenditure

The Estimates also provided for the continuation of previously authorized national development undertakings.

These included the Trans-Canada Highway programme, federal housing assistance, the modernization of transportation facilities, and established programmes of industrial development.

The Government continued to distinguish between ordinary expenditure, capital advances, and financial guarantees.

Parliamentary consideration of the Estimates would therefore concern not only the amount of expenditure proposed but also the financial arrangements through which the several programmes were to be undertaken.

The Main Estimates remained before Parliament for subsequent consideration.

February 27–28 — Preparations for Further Legislation

During the final sittings of February, the Government continued to arrange the legislative business announced in the Speech from the Throne.

The principal subjects requiring further consideration included agriculture, fisheries, national defence, maritime transportation, veterans' affairs, and the revision of various statutes governing public administration.

Agricultural Prices and Marketing

The Minister of Agriculture, the Honourable James G. Gardiner, continued preparations for legislation concerning the Agricultural Prices Support Act and related marketing provisions.

The decline in prices affecting certain agricultural commodities had caused increasing concern among producers.

Although Canadian agriculture continued to make a substantial contribution to national production and export trade, changes in overseas demand and the adjustment of international markets threatened the stability of prices received by farmers.

The Government considered that existing price-support arrangements should remain available to prevent unnecessary disruption of agricultural production and marketing.

The proposed amendments would address the continuation of statutory authority for price-support operations and the acquisition and disposal of agricultural commodities through the appropriate government agencies.

The continued operation of the Canadian Wheat Board and the orderly marketing of Canadian grain would likewise remain matters of government policy.

These measures had not been disposed of by Parliament during February.

Further legislative proceedings would be required during March.

Fisheries Price Supports

The Government also continued its consideration of the Fisheries Prices Support Act.

The legislation provided authority for measures intended to assist the fishing industry in circumstances involving substantial instability in prices and markets.

The Government recognized the importance of fisheries to the Atlantic and Pacific coastal economies and to Newfoundland, whose admission to Confederation had enlarged the national importance of the industry.

Proposed amendments would be brought before Parliament to maintain the statutory arrangements necessary for the administration of fisheries price-support policy.

The detailed provisions remained subject to subsequent parliamentary consideration.

National Defence Legislation

The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Brooke Claxton, continued preparations for the introduction of legislation consolidating and revising the laws governing the Canadian armed services.

The proposed National Defence Act would bring the principal statutory provisions relating to the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force into a more unified framework.

Its purposes included the clarification of administrative authority, the consolidation of military law, and the establishment of common provisions governing service discipline and the organization of the armed forces.

The measure was intended to modernize the legislative arrangements governing the defence services without interrupting the existing organization or administration of the armed forces.

The National Defence Act was not introduced during the February proceedings covered by this account.

The Government intended to bring the measure before Parliament during March.

Maritime Safety and Shipping

The Government continued preparation of amendments to the Canada Shipping Act.

These amendments were intended to incorporate provisions arising from the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, concluded in 1948.

The proposals would also clarify certain duties of Canadian consular officers and revise aspects of the registration and administration of Canadian vessels.

The Government considered that the continued development of Canadian maritime commerce required appropriate attention to safety standards and the effective administration of shipping legislation.

The proposed amendments would be submitted during the subsequent parliamentary programme.

Veterans' Affairs and Public Administration

Further measures remained under preparation concerning the interests of veterans and the administration of public affairs.

These included legislation relating to outstanding wartime prize-money arrangements, the extension of benefits under the War Veterans Allowance Act to additional qualifying veterans of British and allied forces, and amendments concerning militia pensions.

Other proposed legislation concerned the publication and parliamentary examination of regulations, the administration of justice, financial institutions, customs, and the financial relations between the Dominion and municipalities containing substantial federal property.

The Government also intended to continue consideration of the proposed revision of the Indian Act.

These measures formed part of the programme announced at the opening of Parliament, but no general enactment of the programme was implied by their inclusion in the Government's February legislative preparations.

Each would remain subject to introduction, debate, and the ordinary parliamentary procedures.

Conclusion of February Parliamentary Business

By the conclusion of February, the Second Session of the Twenty-First Parliament had established the principal questions which would occupy the House during the coming months.

The Government had presented its programme through the Speech from the Throne, while members of the several parties had commenced a broad examination of its financial, constitutional, economic, and defence policies through the Address in Reply.

The urgent unemployment insurance amendments had received detailed consideration and had passed the House of Commons.

Their final enactment remained dependent upon completion of the remaining parliamentary proceedings.

The Main Estimates for 1950–51 had been presented, establishing the basis for subsequent consideration of supply.

Further legislation concerning agriculture, fisheries, national defence, shipping, veterans' affairs, and public administration remained in preparation or awaited parliamentary consideration.

The Government intended to continue this programme during March.

The House adjourned its February proceedings with the Address in Reply still under consideration and substantial legislative and financial business remaining upon the Order Paper.

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Agricultural Cooperative Development Programme

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February 1949

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With the backing of Prime Minister Tatsuo Morito, and the Socialist Party’s coalition partners in the National Cooperatives, Agriculture and Forestry Minister Kyoji Funada, began the creation of a programme designed to expand and support new agricultural cooperatives. 

The agricultural land reforms introduced following the end of the Second World War had seen substantial areas of farmland redistributed from landlords to formerly tenant farmers, creating a large class of independent smallholders. Under the Socialist-led Katayama government, the Agricultural Cooperative Association Law of 1947 had provided a framework for the establishment of democratic agricultural cooperatives, through which these newly independent farmers could cooperate in purchasing, marketing and agricultural development. These agricultural cooperatives became championed by Takeo Miki’s National Cooperative Party, which aimed to primarily further and protect the interests of small agricultural landowners. 

Naturally, one of their demands for supporting the Morito government and entering into a coalition was the creation of legislation that aimed to further develop and support agricultural cooperatives. This was something that was easy for the Socialist party to accept, they too supported the expansion of agricultural cooperatives, however the reason for this was different depending on the different wings of the party. For the right and much of the centre, the aim was to expand economic democracy and cooperation at local levels, as well as diluting the lingering influence of large landowners. Sections of the party's left also regarded agricultural cooperatives as a potential foundation for the gradual socialisation of agricultural production, with some advocating the eventual expansion of voluntary collective farming.  There was thus little resistance to the implementation of the policy.

The new programme first and foremost established the ability for cooperatives to apply for development grants. Successful applications would see the government provide a grant of up to 35% of the cost of the development, expansion or modernisation of an agricultural cooperative. This could include grants for the purchasing of new equipment, expanding facilities such as barns or warehouses, and the modernisation of existing equipment. Accompanying this would be a form of credit assistance that would allow access to low interest loans for productive investment into the running and expanding of agricultural cooperatives. These could be used to fund a further 35% of a project. This would make it significantly easier for cooperatives to expand and modernise, increasing their overall productivity and profitability, which would benefit both the farmer-members and the general economic condition of rural regions. 

Technical assistance, provided under the postwar agricultural extension system, would also be expanded by the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture on request. Cooperatives would be able to request professionals, technicians and experts to come to their farms to provide agricultural advice, support with financial management, cooperative leadership training and technical training. The intended result of this would be to further develop self-sustaining cooperatives that would be able to, through expert assistance, increase their productivity. This would also support newer farmers who had just joined cooperatives recently, and be an incentive for others to join a cooperative.

In order to prevent abuses and misuse of this programme, the government made it explicitly clear that access to these benefits would be dependent on cooperatives abiding by the principles of democratic governance. This would mean membership must be voluntary, cooperatives could not coerce or force other small farmers to join them. Leaders of cooperatives must be elected through elections participated in by all farmer-members and use of cooperative finances must be transparent to both members and local government. While under the 1947 Agricultural Cooperative Association Law these were already requirements agricultural cooperatives were expected to abide by, the conditionality of grants and credit on democratic governance would ensure greater oversight. Supported cooperatives would be expected to prove their compliance through the submission of annual financial statements, proof their leadership was fairly elected and accounts for the use of public funding. 

Another creation of the programme is the National Agricultural Cooperative Council. This is a body comprising elected representatives of agricultural cooperatives across Japan, whose purpose is to advise and make recommendations to the Minister for Agriculture and Forestry for future agricultural policy. All agricultural cooperatives would elect delegates to a prefectural cooperative assembly. These prefectural assemblies would each elect one representative to serve on the National Agricultural Cooperative Council, which would therefore comprise 47 members. The council's representatives would subsequently elect a chairperson from among themselves, who would be responsible for presiding over meetings and representing the council in its dealings with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It was expected that this would allow for better quality of agricultural policymaking, as Ministers and other government officials would be able to take recommendations directly from those affected by future policies. Likewise, it would give farmers a voice in policymaking that affects them, and contribute to the expansion of representative democracy across Japan.

The council was established to hold three formal powers; the right to submit agricultural policy recommendations to the minister; the right to be consulted on significant changes to agricultural cooperative policy and the right to publish an annual report on the condition of Japanese agriculture and the cooperative movement. This would, however, be a purely advisory body with no legislative power. 

While expanding and modernising existing cooperatives was one goal of the programme, another was to drive more small farmers towards becoming members of cooperatives. There were still a number of farmers across the country who did not belong to a cooperative, something that the government aimed to change. In order to facilitate this, the new programme would include first-time membership grants aimed at reducing the initial cost of joining a cooperative. These grants could be used as partial contributions to initial capital contributions required for membership, and would be conditional on the farmer remaining a member of the cooperative for at least 5 years. Poorer farmers would naturally receive priority and be more likely to have their request accepted. This would be paired with a general drive across education and the media to encourage farmers to join cooperatives. 

These policies were driven by a genuine commitment to the principles surrounding the democratisation of the economy and expansion of cooperative agriculture, the Socialists also had electoral consideration when drafting this programme. It was hoped that these reforms would broaden the JSP’s appeal among rural voters and show that democratic socialism could protect the interests of rural farmers. The Communist party had already been making strides amongst those inclined towards the left in the countryside, as had Yoshida’s conservatives with those on the right. Morito hoped to be rewarded at the next election, and have his mass party approach further validated.

However, the biggest issue for the JSP to overcome regarding this policy was the method for its funding. The American issued Dodge Line prevented excessive spending and would not allow the government to take on debt to finance its programmes. Funding for the programme would thus be drawn from existing agricultural development appropriations, with grants and subsidised credit subject to annual expenditure limits established by the Ministry of Finance. Applications would be assessed according to their anticipated contribution to agricultural productivity, financial sustainability and the economic circumstances of the cooperative's members. 

Cooperative credit assistance would be administered through existing agricultural cooperative financial institutions, with lending subject to established credit controls and any government interest subsidies financed from approved agricultural appropriations.

In discussions with the leftist elements of parliament, the CD government has authorized the creation of a new development agency for the south of Italy, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, or fund for the south. An initial allocation of $2.5 million has been placed to fund, initially, road development, improved sanitation, electrification and some small loans to entrepreneurs.

The government stresses this in but a start to a new development of broad-based reforms and allocations of government funds to 'catch up' South with North and improve southern quality of life and economic prosperity.

[January 1950, New Delhi]

In accordance with prior negotiation, India enters into formal defensive pact with those nations of Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan; and rallies to the defense of Tibet in its fight for freedom. We call upon our partners in this defensive agreement to make ready to defend themselves. We petition the United Nations Security Council to broker an immediate halt to hostilities; and call upon all other nations to pressure the belligerent Government of China to halt its aggression

Unilateral aggression by the Republic of China cannot stand. War has been made where only peace existed before. The clamor of violence must not be heard in the high places of the world.

India has authorized the deployment of the 1st Armored Division, 2nd Airborne Division, 4th, 5th, and 7th Infantry divisions to Tibet, as well as units of the airforces.

(S) These units are ordered to defend Lhasa, and the southern tibetan valley; focus on securing those mountain passes in the region. A breakout onto the Northern Tibetan plateau is only to be attempted with overwhelming superiority; and is to be led by units of the 1st Armored division. They will deploy through the Mountain passes of Sikkim and Nepal. It is realized India cannot fight china in a head on at this time; but perhaps India can hold out in the mountains, force a settlement. A country cannot be birthed into the world expecting others to respect its security, unless it is willing to earn it...

[January 26th, 1950, The Red Fort]

From the walls of the historic structure, the text of the new document, only hours earlier passing through the halls of the Constituent Assembly, and being signed into law by Prime Minister Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel orates the text of the document.

The new era of legal order has officially begun in India; even as circumstances eddy around the government of the new country. Its security and economy are in no way secure; but it will continue on through, in the hope of a better future, in any way it can

[January 1950]

How on earth shall we get to Lhasa, in the winter? This question faces all units of the newly formed Indian expeditionary force tasked with attempting entry into the Southern Tibetan Valley, in support of the Indian aligned regime in Tibet.

There were presently two options: over land, by clearing the passes of snow where possible, so that men and material could cross; or by air, flying the countries limited supply of aircraft through the low mountain passes.

Both options were bad. On foot, the physical barrier of snowfall would prevent a crossing if it could not remediated. Additionally exposure to winter conditions could quickly debilitate or even kill a man who was not properly prepared, even in the relatively low mountain passes selected as lines of advance for the troops. In the air, transport aircraft carrying supplies and airborne troops would have to thread the needle through the widest of the passes, as the C47 transport aircraft had a lower loaded service ceiling than the surrounding mountains. Weather conditions would make this airlift prohibitively dangerous, if visibility did not enable planes to safely chart their narrow courses. The Airforce would need to provide cover with fighter aircraft, to ensure transports would not become targets to Chinese predation.

Some advantages were to be had though. The operation did have the support of Nepalese and Bhutanese authorities, who could assign guides and local units to assist in the foot crossings. Several large motorable passes did exist into tibet, that could support large columns of equipment, even if presently snow was falling on them. The Army also had experience in conducting airlifts of this type; having moved men and material in mass into Kashmir at the start of the 1947 war with Pakistan; though this new challenge was an order of magnitude more difficult, more similar to their participation in flying The Hump in WW2.

The government had authorized procurement from overseas in support of the mission. A critical handful of C-97 stratofreighters would be bought that could more reliably 'Jump the Hump'. Tracked artillery tractors, such as the Lloyd carrier would be capable of carrying supplies over bad terrain, unfinished roads; and wouldnt slow down as much even if conditions degraded. Road construction and repair equipment would be borrowed from the CPWD to ensure the situation didnt unacceptably deteriorate local infrastructure.

Even if this was possible, an even more dangerous challenge laid ahead. The Peoples Liberation Army, bearing down on Lhasa. Hopefully, enough men could be moved through during the winter, that the situation could be stabilized until spring, when larger columns could be mobilized to reinforce these forward units. The Chinese would be facing the same harsh winter conditions India was; hopefully buying time for the mission to succeed.

[M: Sorry this is so late I have been depressed and insane, it hasn't gotten better but if I don't post Dairy will finally get mad at me so I will simply post my way out of depression]

October 7, 1949

Walter Ulbricht stands up among great applause; the Volksrat, now the Volkskammer, cheered and applauded as the ratifying document of their state-- the newly formed German Democratic Republic-- was accepted and signed. Though ostensibly a parliamentary democracy, it was clear that the GDR would be run, mainly, by the SED, and it was inevitable that this would only be further retrenched by later revisions to the constitution.

Ulbricht stepped up to the podium to speak:

"Comrades! Though today it is a great honor to join with you in the reestablishment of democracy in Germany, we must not be blind to the true state of affairs!"

"Germany today is, in the west, still occupied by foreign powers, and still beholden to the power of hostile NSDAP fascists! We must not forget that the enemies of the people still have their guns aimed across the border, toward our new republic, and toward the friend of all democratic peoples, the USSR!"

"Remember comrades, that reunification is still our ultimate quest; the quest of the SED, of all democratically minded people in Germany, and of that great friend of people's democracy, Generalissimo Stalin!"

The flag of the new German republic-- the Red, White, and Black tricolor, with the state emblem proposed by Fritz Berendt.jpg) in the middle, is raised above Berlin; the flag of the people's democracy, of the workers' resistance against Fascism and Social Fascism.

The constitution of the GDR is not particularly radical, as it is in certain ways still based on the Weimar constitution. However, there are certain quirks...

First: There is a certain odd inclusion in the constitution of a rather vague, somewhat sloppily written section guaranteeing a right to "Gender and Sexual Equality", with some vague language about "freedom of relations". Obviously, this was intended to simply be some bromide about the state guaranteeing men and women to have relations free of state interference, though there is a certain way it could be interpreted as having a certain wiggle room...

Second, at the request of the Centre in Moscow, there is a mechanism for reunification, with some specific demands:

"A reunification can be effected by agreement of the Volkskammer and by the prevailing Western Occupation Regime, following ratification by plebiscite people of the GDR and the Western Zone. To be constitutional to be presented for the Volkskammer, a reunification must effect a disarmed Germany which will have guarantees for people's freedoms and welfare, which will have removed all elements and persons formerly beholden to the NSDAP Hitler-regime, and which does not seek to effect illegal persecutions which were pursed under previous regimes.

Or, that is to say: a reunified Germany must be disarmed, generally social-democratic, denazified, and must not persecute KPD members for crimes allegedly committed during Weimar.

[January 1950, New Delhi]

With the escalation of Hostilities in the Himalayas, Parliament has authorized the raising of immediate emergency debt of ₹307.74 crores (roughly 64.6m USD) to fund military procurement.

A significant list of military equipment is needed, as defined by the defense whitepaper of 1949. Of principle importance are logistics vehicles and infantry equipment, necessary to carry out operations across the Tibetan Mountain Passes. Fortunately, India already possesses significant ww2 era surplus to equip its current divisions; but improvements are needed, and surpluses needed to make replacements.

Diplomatic overtures will be made to partner nations to secure favorable procurement terms for the equipment. Focus will be placed on light equipment that can be gained in meaningful bulk with immediacy

Infantry Equipment: Winter Uniforms and Snow Boots (Domestic), 2" mortars, Sterling and Sten Mk5 SMGs, No.32 Rifle scopes, ML 3-Inch Mortars, PIAT, Vickers Guns (Commonwealth). 4.2" mortars, Bazooka, M18 & M20 Recoilless Rifles, M2 Browning AA guns (America), Field Telephones, Radios, Machine Guns 303 caliber (Global)

Artillery: 17-pounder guns, 6-pounder guns, 25-pounder guns, AT ammunition (Commonwealth)

Vehicles: Cromwell Tanks, Valentine Tanks, Bren Carriers, Lloyd Carriers, Dingo armored cars (Commonwealth), M8 Greyhounds, CCKW 2.5t trucks, 1/2t Jeeps, 3/4t Beeps M24 Chaffee (America), Sherman Tanks (Global)

Aircraft: Auster B recon aircraft, Spitfires w/ recon variants, Tempests, Typhoons (Commonwealth), F6F hellcat, North American Mustang w/ recon variant, SB2C Helldiver, C47 Skytrain, C-97 Stratofreighter (America)